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Law and Practice
Will Rhee*
One of law’s most important functions is solving problems.1 Accordingly,
one of the primary purposes of legal doctrine2—the written, black-letter
law in the books3 employed daily by lawmakers to keep a democracy functioning—is to solve problems. The way legal doctrine frames problems
therefore deﬁnes not only the boundaries of what is considered “inside” or
“outside” a problem but also what is considered a successful solution.4
Thus, the cognitive framework we employ to solve problems can affect the
nature and quality of our solutions.5
This article advocates an intradisciplinary6 “law and practice” legal
framework that unites normative theory7—a prescription for how one
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outstanding comments; Jared Jones and Kiersan Smith for their excellent research assistance; and Joan Magat, Ruth Anne
Robbins, Ian Gallacher, and Sara Benson for their superb editing. This article was presented at the June 25, 2010, Ohio Legal
Scholarship Workshop and the April 20, 2011, West Virginia University College of Law faculty colloquium. Finally, I thank
the Hodges Research Fund for funding. All errors are my sole responsibility. I welcome comments at
william.rhee@mail.wvu.edu.
1 See e.g. Paul Brest & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Lawyers as Problem Solvers, 72 Temp. L. Rev. 811, 811–12 (1999).
2 Legal doctrine is deﬁned as “the various sources of law (precedents, statutes, constitutions) that constrain or otherwise
guide the practitioner, decisionmaker, and policymaker.” Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction between Legal
Education and the Legal Profession, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 34, 43 (1992). Legal doctrine is meant to encompass law as it is actually
used on a daily basis by legal practitioners in all branches of a democratic government to include transactional law. Legal
doctrine in transactions, mediations, and alternative dispute resolution (ADR) tends to be post-mortem analyses of transactions, mediations, and ADR gone wrong, leading to litigation (and judicial opinions) or administrative or legislative reform
(and regulations or statutes).
3 See e.g. Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 Am. L. Rev. 12, 14–15 (1910).
4 See generally Paul Brest & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Problem Solving, Decision Making, and Professional Judgment: A Guide
for Lawyers and Policy Makers 34–42, 70–76, 420–28 (Oxford U. Press, Inc. 2010) (collecting authorities).
5 Id. at 35.
6 “Intradisciplinary” is deﬁned as “being or occurring within the scope of a scholarly or academic discipline or between the
people active in such a discipline.” Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary (Merriam-Webster 2012), http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/intradisciplinary (accessed Feb. 17, 2012). The relevant discipline here, of course, is law (or the legal
profession). The term “intradisciplinary” is intentionally used to contrast with the more familiar interdisciplinary “law ands.”
See e.g. Marc Galanter & Mark Alan Edwards, Introduction: The Path of the Law Ands, 1997 Wis. L. Rev. 375, 376.
7 “Norms” are “[s]tandards for how one ought to act. . . . In the terms of practical reasoning, norms are standards that give
reasons for action.” Brian H. Bix, A Dictionary of Legal Theory 149 (Oxford U. Press 2004). The word “normative” implies
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should act—and practical lawmaking8—a description of how legal actors9
actually create and revise legal doctrine in a democracy—to solve legal
problems. This combination of both normative theory and practical
lawmaking provides an absolute advantage10 over the isolated employment
of either.
Normative theory and practical lawmaking provide further insight
into what political theorist Hannah Arendt called the “old and
complicated” conflict between “truth and politics.”11 Because it is
governed by the rule of law, practical lawmaking in a democracy
unavoidably involves politics and the imperfect political process.12 In
contrast, normative theory answers the “why” truth question of practical
lawmaking—politics to what end?13
In light of legal doctrine’s public impact upon our daily lives, we
cannot help but have an opinion about whether practical lawmaking is
consistent with our own implicit or explicit normative theories. Much like
religious beliefs, although we may not talk about our normative theories in
public, we all have them. Even disputing the very validity of normative
theorizing—like agnosticism—is itself a normative theory.

“[w]hat ought to be done. The normative aspect of a discussion or a set of facts is its implications for how people should act,
how rules should be changed, or even how theories should be constructed.” Id. at 148 (emphasis in original). Normative
questions are “‘should’ questions, questions about how individuals or institutions should act.” Aaron Rappaport, The Logic of
Legal Theory: Reflections on the Purpose and Methodology of Jurisprudence, 73 Miss. L.J. 559, 572 (2004). A “legal theory” is
“a set of general propositions used as an explanation” of law that are “sufﬁciently abstract to be relevant to more than just
particularized situations.” Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and Clinical Education, 75
Minn. L. Rev. 1599, 1601 n. 3 (1991) (citation omitted). For further discussion of normative theory, see infra sec. I.B.2.
8 “Practical lawmaking” is what legal actors do to keep a democratic government functioning by creating and revising legal
doctrine. Practical lawmaking thus is inseparable from legal doctrine. For further discussion of practical lawmaking, see infra
sec. I.B.4. For a deﬁnition of “legal actors,” see infra n. 9.
9 There are many deﬁnitions of law; in this article I seek to avoid the black-hole question, What is law? See e.g. Frederick
Schauer, The Best Laid Plans, 120 Yale L.J. 586, 616 (2010). Consequently, this article uses the rather broad term “legal actors”
to represent anyone who formally or informally affects or influences law in a democracy, however law is deﬁned. Formally,
among the three democratic branches of government—elected legislators (and their staff ) who enact statutes, judges (and the
lawyers representing both sides in a litigation) who decide cases and publish judicial opinions, and the executive (and her
cabinet) who implements statutes and publishes administrative regulations and decisions—all are legal actors. Informally,
however, lobbyists (and the organizations or causes they represent) who influence those legislators and the executive through
political endorsements and campaign contributions, community activists (and the people they lead) who influence elections
through grass-roots organizing and public protest, and pundits and academics who publicly critique existing law are also
legal actors.
10 “Absolute advantage” is an economic concept wherein a party “can produce [a] good at lower cost or with higher productivity than the other party.” Gregory W. Bowman, The Comparative and Absolute Advantages of Junior Law Faculty:
Implications for Teaching and the Future of American Law Schools, 2008 B.Y.U. Educ. & L.J. 171, 183 (internal citation and
quotation marks omitted).
11 Hannah Arendt, Truth and Politics, in Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought 229 (The Viking
Press, Inc. 1968).
12 Keith Whittington et al., The Study of Law and Politics in Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics 3 (Keith Whittington et
al., eds., Oxford U. Press 2008).
13 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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This hybrid intradisciplinary framework is examined in ﬁve sections.
Section I rejects a competing framework, the so-called theory–practice
divide, as a false dichotomy and argues that legal academics14 and legal
practitioners15 tend to specialize in micro law or macro law. Section II
explains how legal actors strive to avoid cognitive dissonance, the psychological discomfort that results when practical lawmaking appears to
contradict a preferred normative theory.16 Section III elaborates how all
legal doctrine implicitly or explicitly embodies normative theory. In a
similar manner, section IV explains that because the only way to create or
amend legal doctrine in a democracy is through practical lawmaking,
normative theory must also consider practical lawmaking. Section V elaborates this hybrid combination of theory and practice, ironically called
“law and practice.” A law and practice movement could not only improve
actual legal representation with more objective and more effective skills
instruction but also create more accurate and more intellectually rigorous
legal scholarship with immediate applicability to the real world.17

I. The Theory–Practice Divide Is a False Dichotomy
The so-called theory–practice divide is amorphous and unhelpful. Even
on its own terms this so-called divide is not between all legal theory and
all legal practice but rather between a particular kind of legal theory—
normative theory—and a particular kind of legal practice—practical
lawmaking. A better description of the relationship of theory to practice is
as a micro–macro legal continuum, one that parallels the well-established
relationship between microeconomics and macroeconomics.
A. The theory–practice divide
Chief Justice John Roberts recently decried “a great disconnect” between
legal academics who “deal with the legal issues at a particularly abstract
14 The theory–practice divide also distinguishes between “legal academics” and “legal practitioners.” “Legal academics” are
tasked with the dedicated scholarly study of law and the “improvement of the legal profession through legal education.”
Bylaws of the Ass’n of Am. L. Schs., Inc., Art. I, § 1-2 (adopted Dec. 29, 1971; amended through Jan. 2008),
http://www.aals.org/about_handbook_bylaws.php (accessed Feb. 23, 2012).
15 “Legal practitioners” are commonly deﬁned as that portion of the legal profession in which public and private “lawyers,
clients, judges, and legislators” actually use legal concepts and processes. Jean R. Sternlight, Symbiotic Legal Theory and Legal
Practice: Advocating a Common Sense Jurisprudence of Law and Practical Applications, 50 U. Miami L. Rev. 707, 718 (1996).
In this article I argue that this distinction is illusory: both legal academics and legal practitioners are legal actors. See supra
note 9.
16 See Michael Vandenbergh et al., Regulation in the Behavioral Era, 95 Minn. L. Rev. 715, 759 (2011) (citing Leon Festinger,
A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance 2–3 (Stan. U. Press 1957)); see also infra sec. II.A.
17 Given its hybrid thesis, I aspire for this article to reach legal academics, legal practitioners, and those who self-identify
with both labels. Thus, I seek to explain its points as plainly as possible in the text, leaving more scholarly details to the
footnotes.
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and philosophical level” and legal practitioners.18 This is not a new
sentiment. As the Chief Justice himself recognized, he agrees with his
friend and fellow jurist, Judge Harry Edwards, U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit.19 Judge Edwards, a former law professor
and the author of the famous law review article, “The Growing
Disjunction between Legal Education and the Legal Profession,” is perhaps
the most well-known critic of the so-called theory–practice divide in the
U.S. legal profession.20 This so-called theory–practice divide has many
manifestations21 and is not limited to law.22
The theory–practice divide assumes that legal academics are
concerned primarily with legal theory to the exclusion of legal practice
and that legal practitioners are concerned primarily with legal practice to
the exclusion of legal theory. Many others have already written extensively
about this divide and its possible causes.23 Fundamentally, though, the
theory–practice divide is a false dichotomy.24 The debate over legal theory
and legal practice—insofar as there is any distinction at all—is really
between normative theory and practical lawmaking.
B. The theory–practice divide is between normative theory
and practical lawmaking
Even assuming that the theory–practice divide exists, the dividing line
between so-called legal theory and so-called legal practice is amorphous.
In spite of the many articles written about this so-called divide, “it is
surprising that little attention has been devoted to attempting to specify
what an author means when he or she uses these terms.”25

18 Videodoc, C-Span Video, A Conversation with Chief Justice Roberts, Fourth Circuit Judicial Conference (June 25, 2011)
(available at http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/FourthCi).
19 U.S. Ct. of App. for the D.C. Cir., Harry T. Edwards, http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/home.nsf/Content/VL++Judges+-+HTE (accessed Feb. 23, 2012).
20 Edwards, supra n. 2, at 34.
21 See e.g. Marc O. Degirolami, The Excitement of Interdictory Ideas: A Response to Professor Anders Walker, 8 Ohio St. J.
Crim. L. 155, 158 (2010).
22 Sara L. Rynes et al., Across the Great Divide: Knowledge Creation and Transfer between Practitioners and Academics, 44
Acad. Mgt. J. 340, 340 (April 2001).
23 See e.g. Judith Wegner, Reframing Legal Education’s “Wicked Problems,” 61 Rutgers L. Rev. 867, 969–70 (2009) (collecting
authorities). The debate over the theory–practice divide is relevant to the question of how to prepare law students to be
practice-ready lawyers, as well, a pressing pedagogical question that has likewise been addressed by many others. See e.g.
Symposium, The Profession and the Academy: Addressing Major Changes in Law Practice, 70 Md. L. Rev. 307 (2011)
(collecting authorities).
24 Accord Sarah Buhler, Skills Training in Clinical Legal Education: A Critical Approach, 6 Can. Leg. Educ. Annual Rev. 1, 8
(2011); Nisha Agarwal & Jocelyn Simonson, Thinking Like a Public Interest Lawyer: Theory, Practice, and Pedagogy, 34 N.Y.U.
Rev. L. & Soc. Change 455, 474–75 (2010) (collecting authorities).
25 Mark Spiegel, Theory and Practice in Legal Education: An Essay on Clinical Education, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 577, 595 (1987).
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Ironically, a sincere examination of the bounds of the deﬁnition of
legal practice implicates legal theory and thereby undermines the credibility of the entire divide. Professor Stanley Fish has even argued that legal
theory can be “made to disappear in the solvent of an enriched notion of
practice.”26 Similarly, former law professor and current White House
Regulatory “Czar” Cass Sunstein has observed that “the distinction
between legal theory and legal practice is at most one of degree.”27 After
his experience practicing law, former Acting Solicitor General and current
Professor Neal Katyal commented that “[c]ombining theoretical and
practical skills was eye-opening, allowing me to see the ways in which
practice shapes theory and theory shapes practice.”28
1. Legal theory

What is legal theory? If legal theory is merely “a set of general propositions
used as an explanation” of law that are “sufﬁciently abstract to be relevant
to more than just particularized situations,”29 then legal practitioners
unavoidably use legal theory every day to accomplish their job of practical
lawmaking. All practitioners develop through experience their own
“theories of practice”30 concerning how best to accomplish their practitioner tasks. Judge Edwards himself acknowledged that legal practitioners
can fruitfully employ legal “theory to criticize doctrine, to resolve
problems that doctrine leaves open, and to propose changes in the law or
in systems of justice.”31 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.—himself a
longtime legal practitioner and judge32—wrote that legal theory is “the
most important part of the dogma of the law” and should not “be feared as
unpractical” because, “to the competent, it simply means getting to the
bottom of the subject.”33 In other words, “theory is also just another name

26 Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally ix (Duke U. Press 1989).
27 Cass R. Sunstein, On Legal Theory and Legal Practice, in Theory and Practice: Nomos XXXVII 267, 267 (Ian Shapiro &
Judith Wagner DeCew, eds., N.Y.U. Press 1995). For further discussion about Sunstein’s current position, see infra note 53.
28 Neal Kumar Katyal, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy Goes to Practice, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 65, 69 (2006). For further
discussion about Katyal’s later practice experience, see infra note 53.
29 Goldfarb, supra n. 7, at 1601 n. 3.
30 “Theories for practice” are called “schema” in cognitive science and provide practitioners with “a kind of toolkit of wellfounded procedures within clearly delineated areas of professional work.” William M. Sullivan et al., Educating Lawyers
100–01, 103 (Jossey-Bass 2007) (citations omitted). The question is not whether practitioners use schema in problemsolving—according to cognitive science; all do. But which schema? Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise,
Cognitive Science, and the Functions of Theory, 45 J. Leg. Educ. 313, 381 (1995). All practitioners—novice through expert—
must construct their own schema to use in problem-solving from their personal experience to make the overwhelming details
of a problem manageable. Id. at 355, 379.
31 Edwards, supra n. 2, at 35.
32 Holmes wrote his masterpiece, The Common Law, while he “practiced commercial and admiralty law.” The Canon of
American Legal Thought 21 (David Kennedy & William W. Fisher III, eds., Princeton U. Press 2006). He was a law professor
at Harvard for only a few months before he became a judge. Id.
33 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 78 B.U. L. Rev. 699, 715 (1998).
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for thinking, for deciding, for arguing and examining one’s own beliefs and
principles as well as the beliefs and principles we have been taught.
Theorizing is something that we all do.”34
2. Normative theory

Within the vague boundaries of so-called legal theory, is there a more
deﬁnite concept? Yes, normative theory. Normative theory is a subset of
legal theory that prescribes norms with which to determine the validity of
legal doctrine.35 It is what Justice Stephen Breyer implied when he wrote
that “there is evidence that law review articles have left terra ﬁrma to soar
into outer space.”36
Unlike the ambiguity of other types of legal theory, because normative
theory makes prescriptive claims about truth or effectiveness,37 it is easy
to recognize. All legal theory can be unpacked to reveal an underlying
assumption or ﬁrst principle. That postulate is a normative theory.
Because legal doctrine regulates human conduct, legal doctrine
unavoidably relies upon implicit or explicit normative assumptions whose
legitimacy can be scrutinized by normative theory. While legal doctrine
can create elaborate decisionmaking procedures in an attempt to promote
alleged impartiality, the “unavoidable fact is that no matter how hard we
try to deﬁne impartial decision procedures, we face persistent
disagreement both about basic notions of what is good and right and just
and about which procedures are suitably impartial.”38 “Law,” as Sunstein
observed, “is a normative enterprise; it is inevitably philosophical.”39
Practitioners who claim to ignore legal theory might nevertheless “unconsciously employ methods derived from theory . . . .”40
3. Legal practice

Similarly, what exactly does it mean to practice law? This question
unavoidably implicates the black-hole legal–theoretical question of what
law is.41 Is practicing law restricted to lawyers and judges—licensed

34 Ruthann Robson, Lesbian (Out)Law: Survival under the Rule of Law 15 (Firebrand Books 1992).
35 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
36 Stephen G. Breyer, Response of Stephen G. Breyer, 64 N.Y.U. Annual Survey Am. L. 33, 33 (2008) (citation omitted). Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsberg has added that “some in the academy are writing on topics or in a language ordinary judges and lawyers
do not comprehend.” Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Communicating and Commenting on the Court’s Work, 83 Geo. L.J. 2119, 2127
(1995).
37 See Arendt, supra n. 11, at 229.
38 Joseph William Singer, Normative Methods for Lawyers, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 899, 907 (2009).
39 Sunstein, supra n. 28, at 267.
40 Katyal, supra n. 29, at 73; see also infra n. 55.
41 See supra note 9 for additional discussion.
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members of the Bar? Surely the members of the executive and legislative
branches—whether lawyers or not—also practice law. What about
populist “bottom-up” movements?42 Must, or can, the Montgomery,
Alabama, bus boycott and the 1960s civil rights movement also be
considered practicing law?43 How about reactionary movements without
clearly deﬁned goals or organizers like the worldwide “Occupy Wall
Street” movement?44 What about informal agreements between neighbors
outside the bounds of formal legal doctrine?45
4. Practical lawmaking

Likewise, within the elastic conﬁnes of so-called legal practice, is there a
more deﬁnite concept? Yes, practical lawmaking. Practical lawmaking is a
subset of legal practice that focuses upon the professional advocates and
lawmakers—lawyers, legislators, judges, and executive ofﬁcials—who staff
all three democratic branches of government and produce ofﬁcial legal
doctrine.46 Legal practitioners—whose full-time job is to create and revise
legal doctrine—understandably ask how a particular law review article or
normative theory will help them accomplish their day-to-day job of
practical lawmaking.47
Although practical lawmaking has clearly deﬁned roles, procedures,
and boundaries, it is not necessarily the only way to practice law. Other
legal actors with less clearly deﬁned roles, procedures, and boundaries
may practice law as well. But those other legal actors are not typically the
ones who criticize the theory–practice divide. When legal practitioners
critique the theory–practice divide, they are not referring to all legal
practice but rather to practical lawmaking, the subset with which they are
most familiar and over which they have the most control.
Given the vague, overlapping nature of legal theory and legal practice,
the so-called divide actually refers to the much narrower, well-deﬁned
division between normative theory and practical lawmaking. Much debate
between practitioners and academics over legal theory really concerns

42 Christopher Coleman et al., Social Movements and Social-Change Litigation: Synergy in the Montgomery Bus Protest, 30
L. & Soc. Inquiry 663, 667 (2005).
43 See id.; see also generally Mark V. Tushnet, The NAACP’s Legal Strategy against Segregated Education, 1925–1950 (2d ed.,
U.N.C. Press 2004); Raymond D’Angelo, The American Civil Rights Movement: Readings and Interpretations (McGrawHill/Dushkin 2001); Genna Rae McNeil, Groundwork: Charles Hamilton Houston and the Struggle for Civil Rights (U. Penn.
Press 1983).
44 See generally Alasdair Roberts, Containing the Outrage: How Police Power Tames the Occupy Movement, Bos. Rev. (web)
1, 1 (Nov. 14, 2011), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1959542.
45 Robert C. Ellickson, Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes vii (Harv. U. Press 1991).
46 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
47 Accord Paul Brest, Plus Ça Change, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 1945, 1949 (1993).
48 Singer, supra n. 39, at 901–04.
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conflicting normative theory, “[f ]inishing the ‘[b]ecause [c]lause.’”48 Legal
practitioners are some of the ﬁercest critics of normative theory because
they are unconvinced of normative theory’s usefulness in their day-to-day
job of practical lawmaking.49 But counterexamples undermine even this
subset of the theory–practice divide.
C. Counterexamples contradict the theory–practice divide
When pressed, most thoughtful legal actors would concede that the
theory–practice divide is an oversimpliﬁcation. Furthermore, many might
agree that “persons who are in full possession of their common sense, such
as nonlawyers and ﬁrst-year law students, know that ideally hostility
should not exist between legal practice and legal academia or between
theory and practice.”50
At least ﬁve facts undermine the credibility of this theory–practice
divide framework. First, legal practitioners have authored innovative legal
scholarship, the supposed bastion of legal theory.51 Second, legal
academics have become renowned legal practitioners.52 Third, some legal
doctrinal concepts currently taken for granted in practical lawmaking
were ﬁrst developed or popularized in legal scholarship.53 Fourth, legal
theory has catalyzed changes in legal doctrine.54 Finally, practical

49 See e.g. J.M. Balkin, Understanding Legal Understanding: The Legal Subject and the Problem of Legal Coherence, 103 Yale
L.J. 105, 135 n. 52 (1993); see also generally Michael C. Dorf, Justice Scalia Suggests That the Legal Academy is Out of Touch:
Is He Right?, http://writ.news.ﬁndlaw.com/dorf/20100308.html (Mar. 8, 2010); Seth P. Waxman, Rebuilding Bridges: The Bar,
the Bench, and the Academy, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1905, 1909 (2002) (former Solicitor General commenting that “at the Supreme
Court, academic citations are viewed as largely irrelevant—only a true naïf would blunder to mention one at oral argument”).
50 Sternlight, supra n. 15, at 712.
51 Legal practitioners have published scholarship in the most prestigious law reviews like the top-ranked Harvard Law
Review and Yale Law Journal. Allen Rostron & Nancy Levit, Information for Submitting Articles to Law Reviews & Journals,
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1019029 (Feb. 22, 2011); see e.g. Steven R. Shapiro, Ideological Exclusions: Closing the Border to
Political Dissidents, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 930, 930 n. * (1987); H. Thomas Austern, Presumption and Percipience about
Competitive Effect under Section 2 of the Clayton Act, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 773, 773 n. * (1968); Sidney B. Jacoby, Judicial Control
of Administrative Action in India, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1326, 1326 n. * (1957); see also e.g. George W. Conk, Is There a Design
Defect in the Restatement (Third) Of Torts: Products Liability?, 109 Yale L.J. 1087, 1087 n. * (2000); Diane F. Orentlicher,
Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 Yale L.J. 2537, 2537 n. * (1991);
Aaron Wildavsky, Changing Forward Versus Changing Back, 88 Yale L.J. 217, 217 n. * (1978); Carlos L. Israels, Securities Law:
Fraud: SEC Rule 10b-5, 77 Yale L.J. 1585, 1585 n. * (1968). An estimated 86.6% of newly hired tenure-track law professors
practiced law before entering the academy. Richard E. Redding, “Where Did You Go to Law School?”: Gatekeeping for the
Professoriate and its Implications for Legal Education, 53 J. Leg. Educ. 594, 600–01 & 602 tbl. 3, 612 (2003), and some law
professors—most notably clinical professors—continue to practice law and write scholarship. See Stephen Ellmann, What We
Are Learning, 56 N.Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 171, 200 (2011).
Judges also have authored innovative scholarship. Some of the most-cited legal scholars of all time—including Judge
Richard Posner, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Judge Guido Calebresi, Judge Frank Easterbrook, and Justice Felix
Frankfurter—are or were practicing jurists. Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Legal Scholars, 29 J. Leg. Stud. 409, 424 tbl. 6
(2000); 2 Almanac of the Federal Judiciary 3–7, 14–21, 25–27 (Wolters Kluwer Law & Bus. 2012) (available at 2012 WL
366281, 2012 WL 366385, 2012 WL 366389); Mary McManamon, Felix Frankfurter: The Architect of “Our Federalism,” 27 Ga.
L. Rev. 697, 702 (1993). Whereas these judges may have authored much of their scholarship as law professors (except for
Justice Holmes, who was a law professor for only months, see Kennedy & Fisher, supra n. 33, at 21) others obviously capable
of producing quality scholarship chose to practice law.
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lawmaking has inspired new legal theory and academic scholarship.55
In spite of these factual counterexamples, the selection of a cognitive
framework such as the theory–practice divide ultimately is a subjective
choice because “[t]here is always a level of generality at which any two
things can be said to be essentially the same, and always a level of particu-

52 Just as there is no reason why an accomplished legal practitioner cannot write quality scholarship, there is no reason why
a legal academic cannot become a successful practitioner. There can be much transfer between their respective skill sets.
David A. Binder et al., A Depositions Course: Tackling the Challenge of Teaching for Professional Skills Transfer, 13 Clin. L.
Rev. 871, 882 & n. 32 (2007) (collecting authorities). Legal academics can be just as intelligent and diligent as legal practitioners. Some well-established legal academics—such as Erwin Chemerinsky and Lawrence Tribe—are also renowned for
practicing law. See e.g. Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword: Why Write? 107 Mich. L. Rev. 881, 888 (2009); Vanessa Gregory,
Indefensible, 22 Am. Prospect A11, A11 (Jan. 1, 2011) (discussing Tribe). At different times in their career, some lawyers
rotate between the academy and practice. For example, in the former-law-professor-turned-President Obama
Administration, Paul Horwitz, Honor’s Constitutional Moment: The Oath and Presidential Transitions, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev.
1067, 1079 (2009), several former law professors serve as practicing public ofﬁcials, including former Solicitor General and
current U.S. Supreme Court Associate Justice Elena Kagan (who apparently had little to no courtroom experience before
becoming Solicitor General), current Legal Advisor for the U.S. Department of State (and past Yale Law School Dean) Harold
Koh, past Acting Solicitor General (and law professor) Neal Katyal, and Administrator of the White House Ofﬁce of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (and the most-cited contemporary law professor) Cass Sunstein. See e.g. Fox News,
Kagan a Courtroom Novice No Problem for High Court, Supporters Say (May 10, 2010) (available at http://www.foxnews.com/
politics/2010/05/10/kagans-judicial-inexperience-minor-hurdle-despite-early-criticism/) (discussing Kagan); Harold Hongju
Koh, Statement by Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, United States Department of State, Regarding Crime of Aggression at
the Resumed Eighth Session of the Assembly of States Parties of the International Criminal Court, http://usun.state.gov/
brieﬁng/statements/2010/139000.htm (Mar. 23, 2010); Harold Honju Koh, http://www.law.yale.edu/faculty/HKoh.htm
(accessed Mar. 1, 2012) (discussing Koh); Meet the Solicitor General, U.S. Dept. of Just., http://www.justice.gov/osg/meetosg.html (accessed Mar. 1, 2012); Aziz Haniffa, Neal Katyal a Step Closer to Solicitor General’s Post, 40 India Abroad (N.Y.
ed.) 35, A11 (May 28, 2010) (available at 2010 WLNR 11205030); Professor Neal Katyal Homepage, Neal Kumar Katyal,
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/nkk/publications.html (accessed Mar. 1, 2012) (discussing Katyal); Zachary A.
Goldfarb, Obama, GOP Unveil Competing Plans for Job Growth, Wash. Post A15 (May 27, 2011) (available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/obama-gop-unveil-competing-plans-for-job-growth/2011/05/26/AG3a
DKCH_story.html); Shapiro, The Most-Cited Legal Scholars, supra n. 52, at 424 tbl. 6 (discussing Sunstein). Both Koh and
Katyal have been counsel of record in high-proﬁle lawsuits. Although Koh had never appeared in a real courtroom before, he
led the Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., litigation, 509 U.S. 155 (1993), all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court. Harold
Hongju Koh, Foreword, in Brandt Goldstein, Roger Citron, & Molly Beutz Land, A Documentary Companion to Storming the
Court xxiii (Aspen Publ’rss 2009). Similarly, Katyal led the Hamdan v. Rumsfeld litigation all the way to the U.S. Supreme
Court and thereby created new law concerning the procedural treatment of military combatants. 548 U.S. 557 (2007).
53 Kennedy & Fisher, supra n. 33, at 9. Here are a few illustrative examples: In 1913, Wesley Hohfeld recognized eight types
of legal relations that have become commonplace in legal doctrine today: rights, duties, powers, liabilities, immunities,
disabilities, privileges, and “no-rights.” Id. at 47–54 (citing Wesley Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied
in Judicial Reasoning, 23 Yale L.J. 16 (1913)). In 1923, Robert Hale’s “considerations of social advantage” innovated the use of
policy arguments to justify legal doctrine, a common tactic of legal practitioners and lawmakers today. Id. at 85, 91 (citing
Robert Hale, Commissions, Rates, and Policies, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 1103, 1143 (1940)). In 1958, Henry Hart and Albert Sacks, the
acknowledged fathers of the so-called “legal process school,” further elaborated that “[u]nderlying every rule and standard . .
. is at the least a policy and in most cases a principle. This principle or policy is always available to guide judgment in
resolving uncertainties about the arrangement’s meaning.” Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process 148
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, eds., Foundation Press 1994). In response at least in part to the legal process
school, Duncan Kennedy in 1976 examined the many dimensions of the difference between “rules,” directives that require
lawmakers and ofﬁcials “to respond to the presence together of each of a list of easily distinguishable factual aspects of a
situation by intervening in a determinate way,” and “standards,” norms that directly refer to “substantive objectives of the legal
order” and allow lawmakers considerable discretion in their interpretation. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private
Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685, 1687–88 (1976).
54 Several changes in legal doctrine can trace their origins to legal theory ﬁrst articulated in legal scholarship. As Neal Katyal
observed, “Some practitioners unconsciously employ methods derived from theory[.]” Katyal, supra n. 29, at 73. For example,
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress was ﬁrst articulated in a famous 1939 law review article by Dean
Prosser. Kroger Co. v. Willgruber, 920 S.W.2d 61, 65 (Ky. 1996) (citing William L. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental
Suffering: A New Tort, 37 Mich. L. Rev. 874 (1939)). The famous (or infamous) right of privacy was ﬁrst articulated in an 1890
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larity at which they can be distinguished.”56 The key is “not, Which
description is right?, since all may be; but, Which level of description is
most enlightening?”57 Our choice of cognitive legal framework is not just a
matter of personal preference but rather affects our enlightenment of
solutions to legal problems.
Anecdotal experience nevertheless suggests that legal academics and
legal practitioners at times do appear to be talking past one another.58
Legal academics often favor normative theory over practical lawmaking.59
Legal practitioners often focus on practical lawmaking and ignore
normative theory.60
So how can legal actors solve problems better by using both
normative theory and practical lawmaking? How can focusing primarily
on one to the exclusion of the other limit not only the evaluation of legal
problems but also the effectiveness of their possible solutions?

law review article coauthored by two legal practitioners, one of whom would later become a U.S. Supreme Court Justice.
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890); Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove,
Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality, 96 Geo. L.J. 123, 128 (2007) (discussing Brandeis).
55 Perhaps the best example of practical lawmaking that has catalyzed new legal theory and academic scholarship is the celebrated U.S. Supreme Court opinion of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), supplemented, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
As Justice Breyer commented, “In this Court’s ﬁnest hour, Brown v. Board of Education challenged [the nation’s] history and
helped to change it.” Parents Involved in Community Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 867 (2007) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). Although “[t]raditional legal academic publishing played little or no role in establishing the theoretical and
doctrinal basis for Brown[,]” Rachel Moran, The President’s Message: Transformative Scholarship: Legal Academic Knowledge
for What? 2009-3 aalsnews 1, 6 (Aug. 2009) (available at http://www.aals.org/services_newsletter_presAug09.php), the legal
academy has subsequently produced a prodigious amount of legal scholarship theorizing, lionizing, criticizing, and eulogizing Brown. See e.g. Martha Minow, In Brown’s Wake (Oxford U. Press 2010). Despite initial criticism of its reasoning, see
e.g. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1959), Brown has become one of
the most celebrated Supreme Court opinions of all time. See e.g. Brad Snyder, How the Conservatives Canonized Brown v.
Board of Education, 52 Rutgers L. Rev. 383, 383–84 (2000). Brown itself has spawned a number of normative theories such as
the anticlassiﬁcation doctrine (refraining from using any racial classiﬁcations—even remedial ones—in law), the antisubordination doctrine (helping formerly marginalized people attain equal status with privileged people), and the
interest-convergence thesis (assuming the permanence of American racism). See Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk:
Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1470 (2004) (for
anticlassiﬁcation and antisubordination normative theories); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the
Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 518 (1980) (normative theory on the permanence of American racism).
56 Michael Scriven, Methods of Reasoning and Justification in Social Science and Law, 23 J. Leg. Educ. 189, 189 (1970). This
distinction is often known in academic discourse as the classic lumper–splitter problem. See e.g. George Gaylord Simpson,
Principles of Animal Taxonomy 135–40 (Columbia U. Press 1961).
57 Scriven, supra n. 57, at 189.
58 Cf. Richard Brust, The High Bench vs. the Ivory Tower, A.B.A. J. (Feb. 1 2012) (available at http://www.abajournal.com/
magazine/article/the_high_bench_vs._the_ivory_tower/); Robert Post, Legal Scholarship and the Practice of Law, 63 U. Colo.
L. Rev. 615, 615 (1992).
59 See e.g. J. Cunyon Gordon, A Response from the Visitor from Another Planet, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 1953, 1960 (1993) (observing
that legal academics “consider law practice the province of the brain dead”).
60 See e.g. Brent E. Newton, Practicing What They Don’t Practice: Why Law Faculties’ Preoccupation with Impractical
Scholarship and Devaluation of Practical Competencies Obstruct Reform in the Legal Academy, 62 S.C. L. Rev. 105, 105–56
(2010).
61 Wayne Melville & Xavier Fazio, The Life and Work of John Snow, 74 Sci. Teacher 41, 41 (Oct. 2007).
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Instead of viewing normative theory and practical lawmaking as
opposites, a continuum of micro law and macro law may provide legal
actors with a more comprehensive and thereby more useful cognitive
framework. Legal practitioners tend to specialize in micro law. Legal
academics tend to specialize in macro law. Both legal practitioners and
legal academics, however, can engage both micro and macro law along a
micro–macro legal continuum.
D. The micro–macro legal continuum
Dr. John Snow’s hybrid—micro, macro, i.e., theoretical, practical—study of
the spread of cholera in London led him to be “hailed as the father of
modern epidemiology.”61 In 2003, he was “voted the greatest doctor of all
time” by the British newspaper Hospital Doctor.62 Just as Dr. Snow’s
combination of micro and macro, theoretical and practical research and
action enabled him to recognize how to stop cholera and to innovate
public-health-research methodology, the hybrid study and practice of
micro and macro law can result in new legal insights and innovations.
This micro–macro distinction63 parallels the well-established division
between microeconomics and macroeconomics.64 Whereas microeconomics addresses the behavior of individuals (i.e., producers, consumers,
households, ﬁrms, and industries within their economic environment and
how they respond to changing conditions),65 macroeconomics addresses
the aggregate effects of economic activity (i.e., through regional, national,
and international measures such as inflation, unemployment, and the
demand and supply of money).66 Although macroeconomic theories must
be linked to microeconomic behavior, there is no consensus among economists about either the boundary between microeconomics and
macroeconomics nor the nature of their relationship.67
Likewise, the porous boundary between micro law and macro law is
the legal actors’ roles and accompanying constraints upon their judgment

62 Id.
63 Cf. Mathias M. Siems, Legal Originality, 28 Oxford J. Leg. Stud. 147, 148–50 (2008); Minna J. Kotkin, Creating True
Believers: Putting Macro Theory into Practice, 5 Clinical L. Rev. 95, 97, 99 (1998); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Two Contradictory
Criticisms of Clinical Education: Dilemmas and Directions in Lawyering Education, 4 Antioch L.J. 287, 289 (1986); Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, The Legacy of Clinical Education: Theories about Lawyering, 29 Clev. St. L. Rev. 555, 556 (1980) (all
employing a micro–macro law distinction).
64 This division was ﬁrst coined by Ragnar Frisch. Leif Johansen, Ragnar Frisch’s Contributions to Economics, 71 Swedish J.
Econ. 302, 305–06 (1969).
65 Jae K. Shim & Joel G. Siegel, Macroeconomics 3 (2d ed., Barron’s Educ. Series, Inc. 2005).
66 Id.
67 Abdallah Zouache, On the Microeconomic Foundations of Macroeconomics in the Hayek-Keynes Controversy, 15 European
J. History of Econ. Thought 105, 106 (2008).
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and decisionmaking. Whereas legal actors practicing micro law are more
limited in their judgment and decisionmaking, legal actors engaging
macro law can exercise greater independent judgment and decisionmaking.
1. Micro law

Micro law is the type of law in which a legal actor’s judgment is
constrained by her professional role. Rather than rely upon her own independent judgment to determine how best to solve a particular legal
problem, the legal actor must defer to professional and ethical considerations that limit her range of available options.
In short, legal actors practicing micro law are accountable to third
parties. A legal actor practicing micro law might represent clients in a
particular lawsuit or constituents who elected her to enact a particular
statute. She therefore must attempt to attain their objectives—even if she
personally disagrees with those objectives—if she wants to avoid
malpractice for failing to uphold the attorney–client relationship68 or if
she wants to be reelected to public ofﬁce.69 Likewise, a judge ideally is
supposed to exercise judicial restraint,70 follow binding precedent—even if
she personally disagrees with that precedent71—and restrict her decisionmaking to the speciﬁc case or controversy before her72 or face public
reversal by a reviewing court (or, if she is a member of the highest court in
the jurisdiction, face public criticism of her reasoning from her fellow
justices).73
Such third-party accountability is clearest with a discrete law or issue.
For example, a client will know whether her lawyer represented her
interests appropriately in a particular lawsuit. Likewise, a voter can easily
learn whether an elected legislator or executive passed a promised piece of
legislation or shared the voter’s views on a particular hot-button issue.

68 See e.g. Model R. of Prof. Conduct 1.1–1.18 (ABA 2010) (describing the attorney–client relationship and the duty of
zealous representation).
69 Under the theory of retrospective voting, voters in a democracy retrospectively determine at election time whether the
executive and legislative branches have best represented their interests and vote accordingly. See generally Morris P. Fiorina,
Retrospective Voting in American National Elections (Yale U. Press 1981).
70 See generally Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical as it Sounds, 22 Const.
Commentary 257 (2005).
71 See e.g. Donald Zeigler, Gazing into the Crystal Ball: Reflections on the Standards State Judges Should Use to Ascertain
Federal Law, 40 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1143, 1190 (1999).
72 See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); United States v. Torres, 182 F.3d
1156, 1164 n. 2 (10th Cir. 1999); Model Code Jud. Conduct canon 2 (ABA 2010).
73 Elected judges also face the same reelection concerns as legislators. See Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The
Partisan Price of Justice: An Empirical Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisions, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 69, 76–90
(2011).
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Thus, not surprisingly, micro law—like microeconomics—typically
examines individual legislation, executive action, administrative rulemaking, litigation, and transactions, whereas macro law—like
macroeconomics—examines law more collectively. Furthermore, although
individual micro laws in aggregate constitute macro law—again like
microeconomics and macroeconomics74—the boundary between micro
and macro law varies according to context. Moving from micro law to
macro law, the continuum ranges from a discrete law or issue to a speciﬁc
area of legal doctrine (e.g., American securities law) through all legal
doctrine (e.g., all American law) to general law (e.g., theories of general
jurisprudence75 that seek to transcend the legal doctrine of any particular
nation).
2. Macro law

In contrast, macro law is the type of law in which a legal actor’s judgment
is less constrained by her professional role. Legal actors therefore engaging
in macro law can exercise much more independent judgment than when
creating micro law. Macro law is concerned with systemic issues beyond
the scope of individualized decisionmaking.
Although the precise line between micro law and macro law is
unclear—hence the need for a continuum—legal actors at the highest
national or international level, such as Congress, the Supreme Court, and
the President, often engage macro law when deciding issues of national
policy. Even these top-level legal actors, however, still regularly create,
critique, and revise micro law.
Perhaps the most familiar legal actors engaging macro law are law
professors writing academic legal scholarship.76 Because a law professor
enjoys academic freedom,77 she has fewer constraints on her professional
judgment than a legal actor creating micro law.78 A law review article—
“air law”79—is “written on behalf of no client, in no pending case, without
a court date and addressed to no one in particular.”80

74 See supra notes 65–67 and accompanying text.
75 A theory of general jurisprudence assumes “that there
are certain elements and concepts common to all legal
systems” and attempts to identify and analyze them. Brian
Z. Tamanaha, A General Jurisprudence of Law and Society
xiii (Oxford U. Press 2001).
76 Ample law review articles address micro law as well.
Legal scholarship, however, writes more about macro law
than about forms of micro-law, such as practitioner briefs
and memoranda of law. See e.g. Eugene Volokh, Academic
Legal Writing: Law Review Articles, Student Notes, Seminar
Papers, and Getting on Law Review 35–36 (4th ed.,

Foundation Press 2010) (noting that law review articles
focusing on a single case tend to be less influential than
those focused on a broader legal issue).
77 See generally Matthew Reid Krell, The Ivory Tower under
Siege: A Constitutional Basis for Academic Freedom, 21 Geo.
Mason U. Civ. Rights L.J. 259 (2011).
78 See supra sec. I.D.1.
79 Pierre Schlag, Spam Jurisprudence, Air Law, and the
Rank Anxiety of Nothing Happening (A Report on the State of
the Art), 97 Geo. L.J. 803, 812 (2009).
80 Richard A. Posner, The State of Legal Scholarship Today:
A Comment on Schlag, 97 Geo. L.J. 845, 845 (2009).
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As exhibited by the difference between a legal brief and a law review
article, micro and macro law employ different forms of legal analysis. Both
have substantially different evidentiary burdens, admissible authority, and
preferred methods of reasoning. Because micro law is more speciﬁc than
macro law, micro law has a much less onerous evidentiary burden than
macro law, which, because of its broader scope, is much harder to prove.
Likewise, micro law’s admissible authority is usually restricted to much
more formalist binding precedent and previous legal decisions than macro
law which, because of its broader scope, is more open to creative, nonlegal
sources. Finally, micro law generally employs greater inductive reasoning,
wherein “the claim is that the premises provide some grounds or support
for the truth of the conclusion”;81 macro law generally employs greater
deductive reasoning, wherein “the claim is that the premises, if true,
provide conclusive grounds for the truth of the conclusion[.]”82
A stark illustration of the difference between the relatively unconstrained judgment of a law professor analyzing macro law versus the more
constrained judgment of a legal practitioner creating micro law is the
failed nomination of Professor Lani Guinier for Assistant Attorney
General for Civil Rights, U.S. Department of Justice. As a law professor,
Guinier had written extensive legal scholarship about race, scholarship
that she later believed was blatantly mischaracterized to destroy her nomination.83
As head of the Civil Rights Division, Guinier would have been
charged with leading the agency that “serves as the federal government’s
public and internal voice on civil rights, representing the United States in
the nation’s courts and serving as an authority and resource for other
government agencies on issues relating to discrimination.”84 A large part of
Guinier’s job would have been overseeing the micro-law litigation brought
by the Division in U.S. federal courts.
Then-Senator Joe Biden, Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, law
school graduate, and future Vice President of the United States,85
commented on the impact of Guinier’s scholarship upon her conﬁrmation
hearing:
If she can come up here and explain herself, convince people that what
she wrote was just a lot of academic musing, who knows? . . . I suppose

81 Douglas Lind, Logic & Legal Reasoning 6 (2d ed., The Natl. Jud. College 2007).
82 Id.
83 Lani Guinier, Who’s Afraid of Lani Guinier? The N.Y. Times Mag. 38, 44 (Feb. 27, 1994).
84 Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Restoring the Civil Rights Division, 2 Harv. L. & Policy Rev. 211, 212 (2008).
85 Vice President Joe Biden, http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/vice-president-biden (accessed Mar. 5, 2012).
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it’s conceivable that she could be conﬁrmed. If she comes up here and
says she believes in the theories that she sets out in her articles and is
going to pursue them, not a shot.86

Simply put, a law professor engaging macro law has greater freedom
to express her own personal beliefs without worrying about micro law
judgment constraints.87
The micro–macro legal continuum raises another intriguing research
question: What is the relationship between individual and collective legal
action, between micro and macro law? Does an individual micro legal
action—a single lawsuit, a single statute, a solitary administrative regulation, or a speciﬁc executive order—have a macro legal effect? If yes, how
much? Does such effect vary according to the character or nature of the
particular micro law? Or is the converse true? Does macro law affect
micro law? If yes, how much? Does such effect vary according to the
character or nature of macro law?
Similarly, how much impact, if any, can an individual legal actor’s
efforts make upon macro law and society? For example, does individual
attorney skill really matter, or are legal outcomes more predetermined by
larger social forces? Can a more skillful attorney obtain a more favorable
outcome for her client in a criminal lawsuit than a less skillful attorney?88
Or are all legal actors just bourgeois instruments of oppression?89
Figure 1 summarizes key differences between micro law and macro
law.

86 Robert Post, Lani Guinier, Joseph Biden, and the Vocation of Legal Scholarship, 11 Const. Commentary 185, 185 (1994)
(citation omitted).
87 Although academic freedom is conducive to creativity, the exigencies of practice might lead to more creative and more
realistic solutions as well. Amy B. Cohen, The Dangers of the Ivory Tower: The Obligation of Law Professors to Engage in the
Practice of Law, 50 Loy. L. Rev. 623, 644 (2004).
88 See Jennifer Bennett Shinall, Student Author, Slipping Away from Justice: The Effect of Attorney Skill on Trial Outcomes, 63
Vand. L. Rev. 267 (2010); David S. Abrams & Albert H. Yoon, The Luck of the Draw: Using Random Case Assignment to
Investigate Attorney Ability, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1145 (2007).
89 See Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy, 32 J. Leg. Educ. 591, 591–92 (1982).
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Figure 1: Micro Law versus Macro Law
Characteristic
Legal Actor’s Judgment

Micro Law
Most constrained by
third parties involved in
the creation or revision of a
particular micro law.

Macro Law
Less constrained by third
parties.

Scope

Single legal action.

Multiple legal actions, often
considered from an aggregate
or collective perspective.

Evidentiary Burden

Less onerous burden because More onerous burden because
restricted to specific context. of broader applicable scope.

Admissible Authority

More restricted to formalist,
binding precedent and
previous decisions. Less open
to creative, nonlegal sources.

Less restricted by binding
precedent and previous
decisions. More open to
creative, nonlegal sources.

II. Cognitive Dissonance When Practical Lawmaking
and Normative Theory Appear to Contradict
Promoting consistency between our preferred normative theory and
practical lawmaking is an example of avoiding hypocrisy. No one wants to
be a hypocrite. When we sense hypocrisy between what we believe and
what we do, we understandably try to change or to camouflage such
hypocrisy. That human tendency has been named “cognitive dissonance.”90
When faced with cognitive dissonance between the reality of practical
lawmaking (and its associated written product, legal doctrine91) and one’s
preferred normative theory, a legal actor has only three choices—to obey,
to ignore, or to violate legal doctrine. Obedience to existing doctrine
includes legal change efforts within the system.92 Ignorance of existing
doctrine is what many busy nonlawyers choose daily.93 Violation of
existing doctrine encompasses civil disobedience and even armed
rebellion.94 Every legal actor implicitly or explicitly chooses one of these
three options.

90 See e.g. Girardeau A. Spann, Constitutional Hypocrisy, 27 Const. Commentary 557, 571 & n. 56 (2011) (citing Leon
Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance 1–31 (Stanford U. Press 1957)). See also supra n. 16.
91 For a deﬁnition of “legal doctrine,” see supra n. 2.
92 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)(2) offers a good deﬁnition of such legal change efforts: a “nonfrivolous argument for
extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2).
93 Corky Siemaszko, Ignorance Is Law of this Land. 38% of Americans Fail Citizenship Test—70% Don’t Know Purpose of
Constitution, N.Y. Daily News 2 (Mar. 22, 2011) (available at 2011 WLNR 5572225) (citation omitted).
94 See generally Mary Ellen Snodgrass, Civil Disobedience: An Encyclopedic History of Dissidence in the United States vol. 1–2
(M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 2009).
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One example of cognitive dissonance between practical lawmaking
and normative theory is that of legal practitioners, who can experience
cognitive dissonance between their personal ideals and the disillusioning
reality of their practice. Another is that of legal academics, who can experience cognitive dissonance between their scholarly commentary and its
lack of real-world impact.
A. Disillusionment in practical lawmaking
Like most working Americans, legal practitioners not surprisingly crave
meaning and signiﬁcance in their professional life. In his book The Lost
Lawyer, Anthony Kronman, former Dean of Yale Law School, recognized
that “whatever external goals they aim to achieve through the practice of
law, most lawyers also hope that their work will be a source of satisfaction
in itself. Indeed, many hope that the intrinsic satisfactions it affords will be
important enough to play a signiﬁcant role in their fulﬁllment as human
beings.”95 There is ample evidence, however, that many legal practitioners
are dissatisﬁed with practical lawmaking.96
For example, a 1994 California Bar Association–RAND study found
that two thirds of the surveyed attorneys believed that lawyers leave
practical lawmaking “because of dissatisfaction with the practice of law.”97
Only half of the polled attorneys, if given a do-over, “would still choose to
be lawyers.”98 Their overall view of the legal profession was “profoundly
pessimistic.”99 “Many believe[d] that attorneys are compromising professional standards, and many fear[ed] that ethical behavior, civility, and
collegiality will decline in the future. They [saw] a profession increasingly
buffeted by economic pressures and a future in which lawyers’ quality of
life will deteriorate rather than improve.”100 Whether these dire
predictions proved true is beside the point because they provide empirical
evidence that legal practitioners have viewed and continue to view
practical lawmaking in a similarly negative light.
Legal practitioners’ judgment is constrained by their professional role
when practicing micro law.101 When practicing micro law, as most legal

95 Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession 2 (Harv. U. Press 1993).
96 See e.g. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Review Essay: Competing Visions of Angst among Elite Lawyers, 2006 U.
Ill. L. Rev. 475, 476 n. 4 (2006) (collecting authorities).
97 Deborah R. Hensler & Marisa E. Reddy, California Lawyers View of the Future: A Report to the Commission on the Future
of the Legal Profession and the State Bar 12 (RAND 1994).
98 Id. at xii, 9.
99 Id. at 9.
100 Id.
101 See supra sec. I.D.1.
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practitioners do, they are professionally and ethically restricted from
following their own personal values when those values conflict with their
clients’ interests.102 The belief that micro practical lawmaking “frequently
forces its practitioners to act in ways inconsistent with their own personal
values is a key reason why an increasing number of attorneys feel that they
lack integrity and have thus become dissatisﬁed with the legal ﬁeld.”103
Psychologist Eric Fromm called such cognitive dissonance “‘schizoid selfalienation[,]’ . . . the psychological conflict caused by the failure of our
career path to ﬁt with our aspirations and dreams.”104 Such cognitive
dissonance can alienate legal actors from practical lawmaking.105
Whether practitioners admit it or not, at the heart of this cognitive
dissonance is a tension between their perception of practical lawmaking
and their implicit or explicit preferred normative theory. Practitioners,
however, are not alone. Legal academics suffer from a similar tension.
B. Scholarly desire for real-world impact
Both practitioners and academics frequently joke about how legal
scholarship is rarely read outside of the academy. In his recent talk, the
Chief Justice quipped, “Pick up a copy of any law review that you see, and
the ﬁrst article is likely to be, you know, the influence of Immanuel Kant
on evidentiary approaches in eighteenth century Bulgaria, or something,
which I’m sure was of great interest to the academic that wrote it, but isn’t
of much help to the Bar.”106
Likewise, law professors are understandably self-conscious about how
most American legal scholarship is apparently read only by other law
professors.107 For example, Professor Sanford Levinson’s comments about
legal academics’ lack of engagement with the real world probably make
some law professors cringe. In 2007, Levinson reportedly told Harvard

102 Id.
103 Arthur Gross Schaefer & Leland Swenson, Contrasting the Vision and the Reality: Core Ethical Values, Ethics Audit and
Ethics Decision Models for Attorneys, 32 Pepp. L. Rev. 459, 460 (2005).
104 Rustad & Koenig, supra n. 97, at 477 & n. 10 (citing Erich Fromm, The Sane Society 124 (Holt, Rinehart & Winston
1955)).
105 See e.g. Michael A. Wilkinson, Is Law Morally Risky? Alienation, Acceptance and Hart’s Concept of Law, 30 Oxford J. Leg.
Stud. 441, 463 (2010).
106 C-Span, supra n. 18.
107 Sherrilyn Iﬁll responded to the Chief Justice’s recent ribbing as neither “very funny” nor “very true” and admonished him
and other judges at least to read legal scholarship before they disparage it. American Constitution Society, ACSBlog, Law
Prof. Ifill Challenges Chief Justice Roberts’ Take on Academic Scholarship, http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/law-prof-iﬁll-challenges-chief-justice-roberts%E2%80%99-take-on-academic-scholarship (July 5, 2011). See also Chemerinsky, supra n. 53, at
881 & n. 1 (admitting that although much of his scholarship “likely never has been read by anyone,” he “prefer[red] not to
know the reality that some of what [he has] written almost surely never has been read or cited”). In 2009, Dean Chemerinsky
was the “most-cited full-time legal academic” in the United States. Rachel M. Zahorsky, Irvine by Erwin, ABA J.,
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/irvine_by_erwin/ (Aug. 1, 2009).
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Law School students that if law professors attempted to become involved
in the real world, then “‘the world would probably recoil in horror.’”108 He
concluded that being a law professor is “bad for people who like to make a
difference in the real world” because “[i]ncreasingly, this is an ivory tower
profession.”109
Although whether or not practitioners use legal scholarship has little
bearing on its quality (after all, how can practitioners judge what they have
not even read?), what law professor does not appreciate it when lawmakers
use her scholarship in practical lawmaking?110 As Professor Richard
Lempert wrote, “Law professors want their scholarship to matter.”111
American law professors remain citizens in a democracy dominated
by practical lawmaking and the rule of law.112 Micro legal doctrine
unavoidably and publicly affects their own lives or the lives of their friends
and loved ones daily. Even a legal academic who avoids writing about
practical lawmaking in her highly theoretical macro legal scholarship
cannot help but notice the disparity between her preferred normative
theory and the practical lawmaking in action all around her. To avoid
cognitive dissonance in both academics and practitioners, therefore,
practical lawmaking should consider normative theory.

III. Practical Lawmaking and Normative Theory
Law professors in law review articles frequently write about normative
theory.113 Some legal practitioners believe normative theory has little to no
relevance to their job of practical lawmaking.114 Some probably agree with
Judge Roger Miner, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, who said
that if he “saw the word ‘normative’ in one more law review article,” he
“would scream.”115
If belief in or concern about normative theory were akin to religious
belief, such practitioners would be atheist or agnostic. Just as atheism and

108 Dina Awerbuch, Prof. Levinson Demystifies the Path to Legal Academia, Harv. L. Rec., http://hlrecord.org/?p=12363
(Oct. 19, 2007). In fairness to Levinson, he was merely relating what he understood as the legal academy’s status quo and was
not necessarily representing his own personal views. For his own personal views, see Sanford Levinson, Judge Edwards’
Indictment of “Impractical” Scholars: The Need for a Bill of Particulars, 91 Mich L. Rev. 2010 (1993).
109 Awerbuch, supra n. 109.
110 For examples of legal scholarship that innovated legal doctrinal concepts practitioners now take for granted, see supra n.
54.
111 Richard Lempert, Breaking Deadlock, Shattering Ideals, 1 L., Probability & Risk 83, 93 (2002).
112 For further discussion about the rule of law in a democracy, see infra sec. III.A.
113 Accord Peter Goodrich, Pierre the Anomalist: An Epistemology of the Legal Closet, 57 U. Miami L. Rev. 791, 810 (2003).
114 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
115 Roger J. Miner, A Significant Symposium, 54 N.Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 15, 18 (2009).
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agnosticism themselves are religious beliefs insofar as they are beliefs
about religion,116 disregard of or disdain for any normative theory of law
are themselves normative theories.117 Although there are some generally
accepted names and deﬁnitions for normative theories, there is much
variation.118 Unlike legal doctrine, normative theory has no authoritative
rulebook for its terms.
A survey of speciﬁc examples of why normative theory matters to
both academics and practitioners is helpful to an understanding of its
application and scope.119 Still, such a survey only scratches the surface of
this deep and complex topic: all practical lawmaking is unavoidably
normative.120 Although legal practitioners might reject this claim, such
agnostic or atheist practitioners by default subscribe to two normative
theories essential to the rule of law.
A. Legal doctrine’s default normative theories
The ostensibly objective rule of law is often contrasted with the
supposedly subjective rule of people.121 The rule of law is “that of a regime
of rules, announced in advance, which are predictably and effectively
applied to all they address, including the rulers who promulgate them—
formal rules that tell people how the state will deploy coercive force and
enable them to plan their affairs accordingly.”122 In essence, the rule of law
can be summarized as, “No person was above the law; all must obey it; and
it should favor no [person] against another.”123 The ideology of legalism
applies equally to the rule of law: “the ethical attitude that holds moral

116 Cf. Nelson Tebbe, Nonbelievers, 97 Va. L. Rev. 1111, 1112–13 (2011) (discussing the growing involvement of nonbelievers
in the sociopolitical network, including bringing religious freedom claims). Just as the lack of any religious belief or the denial
of all religious beliefs is nevertheless a norm about religion, so is the lack of any normative theory or the denial of all
normative theory a norm about normative theory.
117 See Jeanne Schroeder & David Carlson, Law’s Non-Existent Empire, 57 U. Miami L. Rev. 767, 768–70 (2003).
118 See e.g. Bix, supra n. 7, at i.
119 Professor Robert Burns has written thoughtful legal theory about the American trial. See Robert P. Burns, The Death of
the American Trial (U. Chicago Press 2009); Robert P. Burns, A Theory of the Trial (Princeton U. Press 1999). Burns explained
how normative theory can interpret practical lawmaking:
My goal here is close to what Hannah Arendt called “thinking what we do,” that is, to raise to a higher level of selfconsciousness the normatively based practices in which we are actually engaged. This goal is consistent with that most
traditional, and paradoxical, of philosophical goals—to think the concrete.
Burns, A Theory of the Trial at 4 (citations omitted).
120 See supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text.
121 See, e.g., Brian Z. Tamanaha, Law as a Means to an End 217–19 (Cambridge U. Press 2006); see also generally Freedom
and the Rule of Law (Anthony A. Peacock, ed., Lexington Books 2010); Ronald A. Cass, The Rule of Law in America 27, 31
(The Johns Hopkins U. Press 2001); William C. Whitford, The Rule of Law, 2000 Wis. L. Rev. 723 (2000); Austin Sarat & L. F.
Felstiner, Lawyers and Legal Consciousness: Law Talk in the Divorce Lawyer’s Office, 98 Yale L.J. 1663, 1667 (1989).
122 Robert W. Gordon, The Role of Lawyers in Producing the Rule of Law: Some Critical Reflections, 11 Theoretical Inquiries
L. 441, 441 (2010).
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conduct to be a matter of rule following, and moral relationships to consist
of duties and rights determined by rules.”124 The rule of law is “a faith in
the power of reason.”125
The imperfect implementation of this rule of law concept is legal
doctrine. Because legal doctrine employs written language, all legal
doctrine in a democracy unavoidably relies upon two normative theories
to function: formalism and positivism. All legal practitioners, therefore,
who create or revise legal doctrine implicitly or explicitly believe in
formalism and positivism.
1. Formalism

Formalism is “usually used in a pejorative sense, to describe analysis . . .
that moves mechanically or automatically from category or concept to
conclusion, without consideration of policy, morality, or practice.”126
Nineteenth- and twentieth-century formalists supposedly believed that
“the law was comprised of principles—including deﬁnitions, concepts, and
doctrines—broad in their generality, few in their number, and clear
enough to permit answers to questions of law to be more or less directly
deduced. The formalists also believed that the law generally is, and should
be, unresponsive to particular factual contexts and circumstances.”127
Although formalism in legal doctrine has its limits, the rule of law’s
ﬁdelity to rule-following is founded upon formalism.128 In fact, such
formalism is an essential prerequisite for the notions of fair notice and due
process129 fundamental to legal doctrine as embodied by the legal maxim
“nulla crimen sine lege (no crime without a posited rule).”130
If legal doctrine were not ﬁnite, publicly available in writing, and—at
least on some level—governed by legal reasoning, it would hardly be fair
to expect lawyers, let alone the general public, to be aware of the legal obli-

123 Peter Charles Hoffer, A Nation of Laws: America’s Imperfect Pursuit of Justice 83 (U. Press Kansas 2010).
124 Judith N. Shklar, Legalism 1 (Harv. U. Press 1964).
125 Pierre Schlag, The Enchantment of Reason 19 (Duke U. Press 1998) (quoting America’s Best Graduate Schools, U.S. News
& World Rep., Mar. 20, 1995, at 84) (internal quotation marks omitted). [That is all the information in the book’s endnotes—
no author was listed.]
126 Bix, supra n. 7, at 69–70; see also, Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 Yale L.J. 509, 509, 548 (1988).
127 Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Systems of Belief in Modern American Law: A View from Century’s End, 49 Am. U. L. Rev. 1, 10–12
(1999). Professor Brian Tamanaha has persuasively argued through his historical research of the so-called formalist–realist
antithesis that common-law judging for well over a century was viewed through “balanced realism” before legal realists
created the self-serving myth of the formalist–realist divide. Brian Z. Tamanaha, Beyond the Formalist-Realist Divide: The
Role of Politics in Judging 6 (Princeton U. Press 2010). For a discussion of balanced realism, see infra sec. III.D.
128 See e.g. Jean Stefancic & Richard Delgado, How Lawyers Lose Their Way: A Profession Fails its Creative Minds 34–36
(Duke U. Press 2005).
129 See e.g. U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2; Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
130 Geoffrey Samuel, Epistemology and Method in Law 32 (Ashgate Publg. Co. 2003).
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gations imposed by legal doctrine. It is of course well established that
ignorance or mistake of the law generally is not an excuse.131
2. Positivism

Positivism “assumes[] that it is both possible and valuable to have a
morally neutral descriptive or conceptual theory of law. . . . ‘Positive law’ is
law that is created by human ofﬁcials and institutions.”132
Legal practitioners who are atheist or agnostic about normative
theory are either intentionally or unintentionally agreeing with positivism.
Accepting existing legal doctrine as the status quo starting point for
practical lawmaking is accepting positivism.
Perhaps the most-common examples of positivism’s impact upon
American law are legal doctrinal courses in law school and the bar examination to become an American lawyer. When legal academics teach
courses on particular areas of legal doctrine, it is clearly assumed that
there is a ﬁnite body of legal doctrine that must be mastered—regardless
of its morality or efﬁciency—because it is the currently prevailing positive
law. The traditional law school issue-spotting hypothetical essay exam,
and, indeed, the bar exam as well, assumes that there is a doctrinally
“right” answer.133
B. Conflicting normative theories critical of legal doctrine’s
rule of law
Perhaps the only commonality between the many varied theories of what
can be termed “Critical Jurisprudence” is shared skepticism of the socalled rule of law and its underlying formalist and positivist normative
theories.134 Three of these many reactionary normative theories are legal
realism, natural law, and a catch-all, other postmodern legal criticism.
1. Legal realism

“Legal realism” is a loose label for “legal commentators, primarily from the
1930s and 1940s,” who sought to enable “citizens, lawyers, and judges to
understand what was really going on behind the jargon and mystiﬁcation
of the law.”135
Historically, legal realism is considered the movement that ﬁrst burst
formalism’s bubble.136 Most practitioners today accept legal realism’s core
belief that practical lawmaking “will vary according to the identity of the
131 See e.g. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957).
132 Bix, supra n. 7, at 120.
133 See e.g. Philip C. Kissam, The Discipline of Law Schools:
The Making of Modern Lawyers 51–52 (Carolina Academic
Press 2003); accord Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of
American Law, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 1047, 1068–69 (2001).

134 Stephen E. Gottlieb et al., Jurisprudence Cases and
Materials: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law and Its
Applications 323 (2d ed., Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 2006).
135 Bix, supra n. 7, at 3 (emphasis in original).
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decisionmakers and the cultural influences bearing upon them”137 as a
matter of course. It is cliché to say that “we are all realists now.”138
Although that is not true,139 both formalism and positivism are essential
prerequisites to the so-called rule of law140—legal actors today appear to
agree with legal realism that practical lawmaking is often political and
unpredictable.141
2. Natural law

“Natural law” is “a mode of thinking systematically about the connections
between the cosmic order, morality, and law. This approach has been
around, in one form or another, for thousands of years.”142 Instead of
deferring to legal doctrine or other positive law, natural law posits that a
higher form of law can trump legal doctrine or other positive law.
Although natural law’s ambit is vast—incorporating even religion itself—
most relevant here is practical lawmaking’s appeal to justice.
Justice often serves in practical lawmaking as the one-size-ﬁts-all
escape valve when all other arguments fail. American legal doctrine is
replete with general references to the pursuit or furtherance of justice.143
Although many practitioners undoubtedly have “an intuitive sense of
justice[,]”144 reasonable minds can disagree. Discussing or debating justice
unavoidably presupposes a normative theory of justice.145
3. Other postmodern legal criticism

Many more normative theories are critical of the rule of law. Here are
some highlights:146

136 Bailey Kuklin & Jeffrey W. Stempel, Foundations of the
Law: An Interdisciplinary and Jurisprudential Primer 153
(W. Publg. Co. 1994); see also generally Michael Steven
Green, Legal Realism as Theory of Law, 46 Wm. & Mary L.
Rev. 1915 (2005). Brian Tamanaha disputes this historical
interpretation. Tamanaha, supra n. 128, at 6.
137 Kuklin & Stempel, supra n. 137, at 156.
138 See Alice Ristroph, Is Law? Constitutional Crisis and
Existential Anxiety, 25 Const. Commentary 431, 433–34 &
n. 9 (2009) (citations omitted).
139 See e.g. Pierre Schlag, Formalism and Realism in Ruins
(Mapping the Logics of Collapse), 95 Iowa L. Rev. 195,
214–15 (2009).
140 See supra sec. III.A; accord Katrina Miriam Wyman, Is
Formalism Inevitable? 57 U. Toronto L.J. 685, 703–04
(2007).
141 Kuklin & Stempel, supra n. 137, at 157.
142 Bix, supra n. 7, at 143.

143 See e.g. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1, 8, 15, 17, 26, 27, 32, 61, 65, 71,
A, C, F; Fed. R. Crim. P. 1, 5.1, 6, 7, 11, 14, 15, 18, 21, 26.2,
32.1, 33, 42, 46; Fed. R. Evid. 104, 612, 613, 807.
144 Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence 391
(Harv. U. Press 1990); Richard A. Posner, Legal Scholarship
Today, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 1314, 1319 (2002).
145 Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice viii (Harv. U. Press
2009). Normative theory is essential to determining justice
because, as Neal Katyal observed, “The parties to a lawsuit
do not focus on general welfare; they focus only on their
own.” Katyal, supra n. 29, at 81. Likewise, as Ronald Dworkin
observed, the notion “that a judge can always decide what
the law requires without calling on any moral or political
convictions or any theory of justice” is “ludicrous.” Ronald
Dworkin, The Temptation of Elena Kagan, N.Y. Rev. of
Books, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/
aug/19/temptation-elena-kagan/?pagination=false (Aug. 19,
2010); see also Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 97 (Harv. U.
Press 1986).
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a. Three types of critical movements
Critical jurisprudential movements responding to formalism, positivism,
and the rule of law can be divided into three types. First, political
movements like feminist legal theory147 “examine critically the impact of
law and legal institutions on the success or failure of particular political
values.”148 Second, interdisciplinary movements like law and economics149
“attempt to study law from the perspective accorded by other disciplines[.]”150 Third, “some of these movements examine the impact of law,
or the role of law, on a community’s culture or in the development of its
social mores.”151
b. Three legal indeterminacy themes
Within these three critical movements is a key debate over legal indeterminacy, the “argument that legal questions do not have correct answers, or
at least not unique correct answers. The issue is sometimes presented
differently: whether the legal materials are collectively sufﬁcient to
determine a (single right) answer to the legal question.”152 A related
question concerns the determinacy of legal doctrine: whether, how, and to
what extent lawmakers should and actually do rely upon legal doctrine (as
opposed to other authorities) when making real legal decisions.153
Legal indeterminacy has three related themes. First, “antifoundationalism” claims “that social theory cannot give a single objective
description of life” or of the law, “nor can language mirror objective
reality.”154 Second, “deconstruction” is the “quest for decomposing and
exposing the alleged ﬁctions, fallacies, and pretensions of Western categories of thought.”155 Finally, “‘relativism’” or “‘pragmaticism’” claims that
“because there is no single truth that is knowable,” there should be “a

146 For general overviews of critical jurisprudence, see for example Kenneth Einar Himma, The Nature of Law: Philosophical
Issues in Conceptual Jurisprudence and Legal Theory (Foundation Press 2011); Isaak I. Dore, The Epistemological Foundations
of Law: Readings and Commentary (Carolina Academic Press 2007); Gottlieb et al., supra n. 135; Bix, supra n. 7; Kuklin &
Stempel, supra n. 137.
147 For a discussion of feminist legal theory, see infra sec. V.C.4.
148 Gottlieb et al., supra n. 135, at 323.
149 For a discussion of law and economics, see infra sec. V.C.3.
150 Gottlieb et al., supra n. 135, at 323.
151 Id.
152 Bix, supra n. 7, at 97 (emphasis in original); see also e.g. Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing
Critical Dogma, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 462 (1987) (collecting authorities).
153 See e.g. Marc Galanter, The Legal Malaise; or, Justice Observed, 19 L. & Socy. Rev. 537 (1985); Richard L. Abel, Law Books
and Books about Law, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 175 (1973); Pound, supra n. 3 (all discussing the difference between legal doctrine as
written or interpreted and as applied or ignored).
154 Dore, supra n. 146, at 754.
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pragmatic accommodation toward and tolerance of multiple conceptions
of truth.”156
C. Practical lawmaking is ground zero for debates
over normative theory
The purpose of this broad-brush overview of legal doctrine’s default
normative theories and corresponding conflicting theories critical of the
rule of law was to debunk the myth that practical lawmaking is somehow
independent of or removed from normative theory. Perceiving them as
such is indeed a false dichotomy.157 Such an overview reveals not only that
practical lawmaking relies upon formalism, positivism, and the rule of law,
but also that it is ground zero for debates over normative theory. All
normative theory about legal doctrine can be considered either supportive
or critical of practical lawmaking’s rule of law assumptions.
In light of the desirability of uniting normative theory and practical
lawmaking, is there a particular type of normative theory most conducive
to the law and practice framework? Yes, balanced realism.
D. What is needed is balanced realism
This overview of normative theories supportive or critical of the rule of
law demonstrates that both kinds of normative theories are useful when
creating, critiquing, and revising legal doctrine. Because proponents of
law and practice believe that both normative theory and practical
lawmaking together are essential to solve legal problems,158 they prefer
normative theories that balance a skepticism of and a ﬁdelity to legal rules
called “balanced realism.”
[Balanced realism] has two integrally conjoined aspects—a skeptical
aspect and a rule-bound aspect. It refers to an awareness of the flaws,
limitations, and openness of law, an awareness that judges sometimes
make choices, that they can manipulate legal rules and precedents, and
that they sometimes are influenced by their political and moral views
and their personal biases (the skeptical aspect). Yet it conditions this
skeptical awareness with the understanding that legal rules nonetheless
work; that judges abide by and apply the law; that there are practicerelated, social, and institutional factors that constrain judges; and that
judges render generally predictable decisions consistent with the law (the
rule-bound aspect).159

155 Id.

157 For further discussion, see supra sec. I.

156 Id.

158 For further discussion, see supra notes 10–13 and
accompanying text.
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Legal rules and their criticism are unavoidably codependent, as legal
practitioner Felix Cohen160 observed in his celebrated 1935 law review
article, “Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach”:161
The positive task of descriptive legal science cannot . . . be entirely
separated from the task of legal criticism. The collection of social facts
without a selective criterion of human values produces [a] horrid
wilderness of useless statistics. The relation between positive legal
science and legal criticism is not a relation of temporal priority, but of
mutual dependence. Legal criticism is empty without objective
description of the causes and consequences of legal decisions. Legal
description is blind without the guiding light of a theory of values. It is
through the union of objective legal science and a critical theory of social
values that our understanding of the human signiﬁcance of law will be
enriched.162

Without the criticism of realist or postmodern legal scholars, the
myth of legal science can perpetuate privilege, hierarchy, and oppression.
There is a danger of “putting all of our intellectual eggs in a solitary
basket”163 and of arrogantly “assum[ing] that the professional role of the
lawyer is morally defensible—that legal thinking in general and the
ideology of advocacy and the adversary system in particular are socially
and ethically justiﬁable.”164
In contrast, however, legal criticism without constructive suggestions
about how to improve practical lawmaking may be dismissed as nihilistic
by the very privileged and powerful people who need to be listening.165
Ironically, a common—and unfair—rejoinder to such legal criticism is,
“‘Now I’m no great defender of the rule of law, but what would you put in
its place?’”166 The rejoinder is unfair because legal criticism—even
criticism without constructive suggestions for change—nevertheless is the
ﬁrst step for legal change. That being said, at some point legal practi-

159 Tamanaha, supra n. 128, at 6; accord Frederick Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Policy 645, 677
(1991).
160 Kennedy & Fisher, supra n. 33, at 165–69.
161 According to one study, the seventy-second most-cited law review article of all time. Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited
Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 751, 766 tbl. I (1996).
162 Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 809, 849 (1935).
163 James R. Elkins, Moral Discourse and Legalism in Legal Education, 32 J. Leg. Educ. 11, 15 (1982).
164 Id. at 12.
165 Angela P. Harris, Teaching the Tensions, 54 St. Louis U. L.J. 739, 750 & n. 50 (2010) (collecting authorities); see also Judith
S. Kaye, in Comments on Professor Spann’s Paper, 1988 Annual Surv. of Am. L. 259, 269 (1988); Alvin B. Rubin, Does Law
Matter? A Judge’s Response to the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 37 J. Leg. Educ. 307 (1987) (two judges’ responses to
critical legal theory).
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tioners need to attempt to translate such criticism into practical
lawmaking to make such legal change reality. Legal doctrine in a
democracy thus needs both legal science and legal criticism.167
C. The legal determinacy paradox
The debate over practical lawmaking highlights the fundamental challenge
of legal doctrine, the legal determinacy paradox. Although legal doctrine
can often be considered indeterminate,168 the function of legal doctrine
remains to provide the ofﬁcial written instructions that keep our democratic governing institutions running. The legal determinacy paradox is
the unavoidable structural dilemma of legal doctrine that requires its oversimpliﬁed framing in imperfect words for public notice even though the
very act of framing legal doctrine can result in its unjust perpetuation of
privilege, the marginalization of oppressed groups, or the obstruction of
the social policies or societal efﬁciencies that it seeks to promote.
Professor Ruth Gavison echoed this paradox when she concluded, “[N]o
legal theorist has ever argued that the legal system is nothing but rules,”
and “[N]o one has argued that we can have a legal system without legal
rules.”169
Based upon the speciﬁc factual and procedural circumstances,
different types of legal doctrine might require a more positivist–formalist
or realist–postmodern conception.170 Because legal doctrine legitimately
can be considered a ﬁnite body of positive law that is both teachable and
learnable171 and because legal doctrine remains governed by a “grammar”
of logical reasoning,172 legal doctrine in a democracy must incorporate
legal formalism.173
Paradoxically, however, the very process of publicly putting legal
doctrine down into words to further fair notice and due process174 can be
abused to perpetuate privilege and the status quo under the guise of false
objectivity. As the realist and postmodern critique of legal doctrine
demonstrates, what might appear on the surface to be the so-called “rule
of law,” upon closer scrutiny could actually be the “rule of men”—rich,
white, privileged, powerful, self-protecting, self-perpetuating men. All

166 Richard Michael Fischl, The Question That Killed
Critical Legal Studies, 17 L. & Soc. Inquiry 779, 780 (1992).
For examples of attempts by critical legal theorists to
develop such positive programs, see infra sec. V.C.6.
167 Contra Schlag, supra n. 140, at 214–15.
168 For a deﬁnition of “legal indeterminacy,” see supra notes
153–57 and accompanying text.
169 Ruth Gavison, Comment: Legal Theory and the Role of
Rules, 14 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Policy 727, 731–32 (1991).

170 See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 Cal. L.
Rev. 953, 955 (1995) (advocating a context-speciﬁc form of
legal decisionmaking).
171 Samuel, supra n. 131, at 32.
172 Lind, supra n. 82, at 1.
173 For a discussion of formalism, see supra sec. III.A.1.
174 For a discussion of fair notice and due process, see
supra notes 130–31 and accompanying text.
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realist and postmodern critical jurisprudence can be considered a
reaction—from a variety of different jurisprudential viewpoints and identities—to the rule of law and its concomitant ideology of rule-following
legalism.175 To avoid cognitive dissonance,176 legal actors must have
internal consistency with practical lawmaking—in creating, ignoring, or
revising legal doctrine—and with their preferred normative theory.
This codependent cycle of the creation, critique, and revision of legal
doctrine underlies the need for neither a solely positivist—or formalist—
nor a solely realist—or postmodern—view of legal doctrine, but rather a
balanced realist view.177 Although balanced realism aims to balance the
need for both realistic skepticism and rule-bound formalism, balanced
realism nevertheless provides no guidance on how to select a critical
jurisprudential theory to balance with formalism and positivism when
assessing existing legal doctrine.
Although interdisciplinary legal insights from other academic disciplines play a critical role in the normative assessment of existing legal
doctrine,178 practical lawmaking, the actual creation and revision of legal
doctrine, remains controlled by legal practitioners. When legal actors
engage in either practical lawmaking to create or revise legal doctrine or
legal doctrine’s critique through normative theory, they do so the same
way: through advocacy179 (employing some combination of pathos, ethos,
or logos180) and the creation of legal rhetorics181 (the common ways both
practitioners and academics use words to communicate to a legal
audience, be it lawmakers or law professors). Both legal advocacy and legal
rhetorics employ legal reasoning and often make claims concerning the
pursuit of justice.182
In addition to interdisciplinary insights, the normative critique of
legal doctrine is also informed by—among other considerations—legal

175 See Gottlieb et al., supra n. 135, at 323; Shklar, supra n. 125, at 1.
176 For a discussion of “cognitive dissonance,” see supra sec. II.
177 “Balanced realism” is deﬁned supra sec. III.D.
178 Kuklin & Stempel, supra n. 137, at ch. 1–3, 6.
179 As Jed Scully realized, “[T]here is convincing evidence that the concept and practice of advocacy is much broader than
its connection to any judicial system.” Jed Scully, Advocacy without Borders—Advocacy in the Twenty-First Century, 23 Am. J.
Tr. Advoc. 347, 352 (1999). Because, like any other lawyer, a legal academic seeks to persuade her audience, legal scholarship
is just another form of advocacy.
180 These three core modes of advocacy were ﬁrst coined by Aristotle. While “ethos” concerns ethics, credibility, and
character; “logos” refers to logical arguments based upon reason; and “pathos” refers to emotional and narrative arguments.
Helen A. Anderson, Changing Fashions in Advocacy: 100 Years of Brief-Writing Advice, 11 J. App. Prac. & Process 1, 3 n. 7
(2010) (citation omitted). The debate over which mode should dominate in advocacy traces back to Aristotle and Plato. Id.
181 Legal “rhetorics” is “the art of using language to persuade, that is, to seek agreement, cooperation, or action” in the law.
Eileen A. Scallen, Evidence Law as Pragmatic Legal Rhetoric: Reconnecting Legal Scholarship, Teaching and Ethics, 21
Quinnipiac L. Rev. 813, 829 & n. 63 (2003). The term is plural because “the labeling or deﬁnition of ‘rhetoric’ is a crucial
rhetorical act in itself.” Id. at 830.
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criticism183 and academic judgment.184 In a similar manner, the creation
and revision of legal doctrine is informed by—among other considerations—real-world experience, legal skills,185 and practitioner (or, whene
appropriate, client) judgment.186
The diagram below illustrates this legal determinacy paradox.

182 For a discussion of legal doctrine’s use of appeals to the pursuit of justice—a natural law concept—see supra notes
143–46 and accompanying text.
183 For a discussion of critical jurisprudence, see supra sec. III. B.3.a.
184 As discussed supra sec. I.D, because it is not ethically constrained by the attorney–client privilege or the limits of individual lawmaking, academic judgment is broader than practitioner judgment.
185 Legal skills are “a range of lawyering tasks, such as . . . interviewing and counseling, negotiating, fact investigation, legal
research, legal analysis and developing a case theory (for either a transaction or a litigated case), trial advocacy, mediation,
appellate advocacy, and legal drafting.” Deborah Maranville, Passion, Context, and Lawyering Skills: Choosing Among
Simulated and Real Clinical Experiences, 7 Clin. L. Rev. 123, 129–30 (2000).
186 As discussed supra sec. I.D, because it is ethically constrained by the attorney–client privilege or the limits of individual
lawmaking, practitioner (or client) judgment is narrower than academic judgment.
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The public nature of this paradox demonstrates that the creation-andrevision process on the one hand and the critique process on the other
hand are codependent in their use of legal doctrine itself. Once legal
doctrine is created or revised, it must be promulgated in writing to
provide the public with positivist and formalistic notice of the new legal
doctrine as required by the democratic rule of law.187 Correspondingly, the
realist and postmodern critique of that same doctrine would be impossible
without the promulgation of such doctrine. In other words, the normative
critique of legal doctrine ironically relies upon legal doctrine’s publication
in writing and its public availability, two values that are characteristic of
positivism and formalism.
Although normative theory and practical lawmaking are interrelated,
how should legal actors discriminate between the many available
normative theories? The only way to test the quality or applicability of
particular normative theories is through practical lawmaking. Normative
theory, therefore, should consider practical lawmaking.

IV. Normative Theory and Practical Lawmaking
Although normative theory in concept is essential for practical
lawmaking, individual normative theories can vary in their quality or realworld applicability.188 Moreover, normative theories can vary in
persuasiveness and scholarly nature: although a common-sense legal
theory based solely upon a practitioner’s experience might not be as
persuasive or scholarly as the more-established jurisprudential
movements summarized earlier,189 this ad hoc theory based upon personal
experience is no less of a normative theory than, say, natural law.190
Because what looks good in theory might not actually work in
practice, normative theory needs practical lawmaking to test theory with
real-world implementation.191 After all, in most other ﬁelds of the
academy, “theory has to be testable; it is a hypothesis, a prediction, and

187 See supra notes 129–32 and accompanying text.
188 See Jules L. Coleman, Legal Theory and Practice, 83 Geo. L.J. 2579, 2580 (1995).
189 See supra sec. III.
190 For a deﬁnition of “natural law,” see supra sec. III.B.2.
191 For examples of scholarship that tests normative theory with practical lawmaking, see Craig S. Warkol, Resolving the
Paradox between Legal Theory and Legal Fact: The Judicial Rejection of the Theory of Efficient Breach, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 321,
343 (1998) (explaining why judges may have rejected the theory of efﬁcient breach of contract in practical lawmaking);
Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 395, 395–400 (1995) (developing a
“ﬁdelity theory” to explain how doctrinal changes in U.S. constitutional law “may maintain ﬁdelity with past understandings
of the document’s meaning and purpose”); Lawrence Byard Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action: A Theory of the First
Amendment Freedom of Speech, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 54, 55 (1989) (testing Jürgen Habermas’ theory of communicative action
with existing First Amendment legal doctrine).
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therefore subject to proof.”192 Although normative theory, because of its
often philosophical nature, might be impossible to test conclusively, one
still can hypothesize testable effects in practical lawmaking that might
either support or refute the normative theory.193
Accordingly, practical lawmaking provides a readily accessible and
relevant source of empirical legal data with which to test normative theory
in two ways. First, practical lawmaking can provide a new legal-realist
critique of normative theory. Second, legal academics who selectively
cherry pick legal doctrine, such as appellate opinions, as evidence to
support their preferred normative theory out of its practical lawmaking
context risk committing the fallacy of suppressed evidence.
A. A new legal-realist critique of normative theory
Legal realism has long distinguished between the “‘law in the books’” and
the “‘law in action.’”194 New legal realism employs quantitative empirical
studies of practical lawmaking—such as legal outcomes in judicial decisionmaking—to determine whether normative theory on paper reflects
empirical, ground truth.195
Practical lawmaking thus provides empirical data with which to test
normative theory without the translation concerns of other interdisciplinary sources. Unlike legal doctrine, which after all is the product of
practical lawmaking, all of the social sciences initially must translate
practical lawmaking into their own respective concepts and categories
before interdisciplinary analysis can take place.196 Furthermore, in light of
the complex human makeup of legal institutions, practical lawmaking
might be a source of data with which to test normative theory superior to
interdisciplinary sources because of practical lawmaking’s “unmediated

192 Lawrence M. Friedman, Law Reviews and Legal Scholarship: Some Comments, 75 Denv. U. L. Rev. 661, 668 (1998).
193 Cf. Robert M. Lawless et al., Empirical Methods in Law 10–13 (Aspen Publishers 2010). For example, the normative
theory that increased punishment and retribution is the best deterrent to crime is difﬁcult to test directly. Id. at 12. Though
not testing that normative theory directly, in a controversial series of articles, Professors Steven Levitt and John Donohue III
identiﬁed testable factors associated with that normative theory such as more police, more certain prison sentencing, the
decline of the crack cocaine epidemic, the legalization of abortion, the strong economy, changing demographics, better
policing strategies, gun control laws, concealed carry laws, and the increased use of capital punishment to test as explanations for the well-documented decline of crime in the 1990s. Id. at 12–13 (citing Steven Levitt, Understanding Why Crime
Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors That Explain the Decline and Six Factors That Do Not, 18 J. Econ. Persp. 163 (2004); John J.
Donohue III & Steven D. Levitt, The Impact of Legalized Abortion on Crime, 116 Q.J. Econ. 379 (2001); John J. Donohue &
Steven D. Levitt, Further Evidence That Legalized Abortion Lowered Crime: A Reply to Joyce, 39 J. Hum. Res. 29 (2004)).
194 Katherine R. Kruse, Getting Real about Legal Realism, New Legal Realism, and Clinical Education, 56 N.Y. L. Sch. L. Rev.
659, 660 (2012) (quoting Pound, supra n. 3, at 15) (internal quotation marks omitted).
195 See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 831, 834–35 (2008).
196 David Nelken, Can Law Learn from Social Science, 35 Isr. L. Rev. 205, 206 n. 3 (2001). For an excellent recent discussion
of these issues, see Elizabeth Mertz, Undervaluing Indeterminacy: Translating Social Science into Law, 60 DePaul L. Rev. 397,
397 (2011).
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access to actual human situations and problems in contemporary life.”197
In addition, legal “[p]ractitioners . . . often have sensible insights” on the
normative questions underlying legal theory and “may provide useful
insight into why something is done a certain way, or why a new theory
might destabilize other areas of law.”198
Finally, the “logic of relying on practitioners” is prevalent in legal
doctrine.199 For example, Chevron deference in administrative law is
premised upon listening to practitioners.200 Likewise, the Geneva
Conventions require military professionals (i.e., practitioners of a different
kind) and not politicians to determine whether someone is a prisoner of
war.201
B. Fallacy of suppressed evidence
Legal academics who claim that their scholarship can serve as a practical
guide for lawmakers or cite appellate opinions, statutes, or other legal
doctrine as supporting authority in their scholarship must be open to
practical application considerations—to include an examination of the
practical lawmaking used to create legal doctrine—or risk committing the
fallacy of suppressed evidence. The fallacy of suppressed evidence occurs
“whenever an argument is stated as authority, and a relevant, damaging
portion of that authority is intentionally or accidentally omitted.”202
Legal scholarship that selectively employs legal doctrine, yet disdains
the practical lawmaking actually used to create that same legal doctrine,
would commit this fallacy. For example, an article that cites a judicial
opinion as supporting authority for its thesis yet disdains practical
lawmaking makes the fallacious assumption that the cherry-picked
judicial opinion rationally reflects the article’s argument when in actuality
other considerations not reflected in the opinion but part of practical
lawmaking, such as unfair factual ﬁndings,203 incompetent lawyering, or
politics, might have been the real cause. Likewise, legal scholarship that
claims to provide pragmatic guidance to lawmakers while disdaining the

197 Hanoch Dagan & Roy Kreitner, The Character of Legal Theory, 96 Cornell L. Rev. 671, 679 (2011).
198 Katyal, supra n. 29, at 70.
199 Id. at 70 n. 20.
200 Id. at 70 nn. 20, 160 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
201 Id. at 70 n. 20.
202 Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co., 42 Fed. Appx. 219, 200 (10th Cir. 2002) (Aldisert, J., sitting
by designation) (citing Jack L. Landau, Logic for Lawyers, 13 Pac. L.J. 59, 93–94 (1981)).
203 For example, legal academics who uncritically accept the reported facts of a judicial opinion as true are making a considerable assumption. An examination of the practical lawmaking used to create that judicial opinion as well as of the advocates
and parties involved might cast doubt on the accuracy of those reported facts. See Anthony G. Amsterdam & Jerome Bruner,
Minding the Law 287 (Harv. U. Press 2000).
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practical lawmaking that lawmakers actually use when creating legal
doctrine would also commit this fallacy.
Normative theory can have “epistemological integrity” only if
understood “in context and in complexity”204 because “[l]ive-client”
examples provide data on “the extrajudicial facts, the systematic values of
the forum, the norms of the community, the options open to opponents of
our client’s interests and many other factors” that “do not and cannot exist
in the simulated or hypothetical instance.”205 Practical lawmaking tests
normative theory with “nuances that only real experience can provide.”206
Both practical lawmaking and normative theory can be leveraged through
law and practice.

V. A Law and Practice Movement
A. Another “law and”
The term “law and practice” here is employed with intentional irony
because, through the proliferation of “law ands,” legal academics have
ironically welcomed interdisciplinary strangers into their home while
maintaining within the walls of that same home their feud with their legalpractitioner siblings.207 Because the legal academy and legal practice
remain two sides of the same legal profession, perhaps a more accurate but
less descriptive term would have been just “Law.”208 The proliferation of
such “law and” scholarship in the American legal academy reflects a
consensus that the study of law “is not to be understood on its own terms,
but requires the application of some method or substance provided by
other disciplines.”209 After all, many disciplines other than law have long
studied legal doctrine.210 Underlying all “law and” scholarship is the
assumption that the discipline after the coordinating conjunction can
provide additional insights to the traditional study of law.211
As Judge Edwards observed, “‘Law and’ scholars with true intellectual
conﬁdence would acknowledge the legitimacy of alternative, and comple-

204 Marjorie A. McDiarmid, What’s Going on Down There in the Basement: In-House Clinics Expand Their Beachhead, 35
N.Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 239, 287 (1990).
205 Id. at 288.
206 Id. In contrast, legal scholarship that refrains from claiming any usefulness to lawmakers or from citing any real-world
legal doctrine as evidentiary authority might be practically unwise but logically would be free to disdain practical lawmaking.
207 See e.g. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Forward: Interdisciplinarity, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 1217, 1217 (2002); George L. Priest, Social
Science Theory and Legal Education: The Law School as University, 33 J. Leg. Educ. 437, 437 (1983).
208 See supra nn. 14–15.
209 Galanter & Edwards, supra n. 6, at 376.
210 See e.g. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, supra n. 145, at 1316.
211 Accord Lee C. Bollinger, The Mind in the Major American Law School, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 2167, 2167 (1993).
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mentary, approaches.”212 Law and practice is such an alternative and
complementary approach to other “law and” scholarship. Just as the study
of law has been enriched by the interdisciplinary perspectives of other
disciplines,213 the study of legal doctrine can be enriched by the unique
insights of practical lawmaking.
B. The inside perspective of law
The essential difference, however, between law and practice’s intradisciplinary approach and the interdisciplinary approach of other “Law ands” is
perspective. Whereas the interdisciplinary approach uses an outside
perspective, “roughly, looking at legal phenomena from the standpoint of
one or more of the social sciences[,]” law and practice’s intradisciplinary
approach uses an “inside perspective,” focused “on legal rules and
procedures the way that lawyers and judges usually see them—from within
the legal system . . . .”214 As David Kennedy and William Fisher III aptly
articulated in the legal reasoning context, law and practice scholarship is
focused upon the
vigorous intellectual tradition within the ﬁeld of law. Scholars in [other
ﬁelds] all refer to law, and each of these disciplines has its own—
outsider’s—idea about what law is and how it works. The experience of
lawyers and legal scholars reading the work of colleagues in other ﬁelds is
often a frustrating one. “If only they had a better sense of how law
worked from the inside,” we often think, or “if they had only gone to law
school.”215

Although law and practice welcomes the “outside” perspective tools
and insights of other disciplines, there are two instrumental differences
between law and practice and other interdisciplinary movements. Not
only is law and practice ultimately controlled and guided by the legal
profession (perhaps as part of an interdisciplinary team but a team always
led by a lawyer216) but also law and practice is limited to furthering
justice—however deﬁned217—in legal doctrine used by lawmakers in the
real world through both scholarship and practical action.

212 Edwards, supra n. 2, at 52.
213 Kuklin & Stempel, supra n. 137, chs. 1–3, 6.
214 Stewart Macaulay et al., Law in Action: A Socio-Legal
Reader 1 (Foundation Press 2007) (emphasis in original).
215 Kennedy & Fisher, supra n. 33, at ix (emphasis in
original).
216 Since Louis Brandeis’ so-called “Brandeis brief ” in
Muller v. Oregon (see Jennifer Friesen & Ronald Collins,
Looking Back on Muller v. Oregon, 69 A.B.A. J. 293 (1983))
interdisciplinary research has been a commonplace tool of

legal practitioners. “Practicing lawyers frequently make use
of nonlegal learning and data in arguing cases, as do political
actors who shape the law. So do judges who interpret the law
and apply it to speciﬁc factual contexts.” Kuklin & Stempel,
supra n. 137, at 1. Law and practice agrees with Judge Fuld
that interdisciplinary scholarship “must seek to relate the
law to the problems of the community at large.” Stanley Fuld,
A Judge Looks at the Law Review, 28 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 915, 917
(1953). This approach uses interdisciplinary research “as a
tool that lawyers can use for legal ends.” The Role of Social
Science in Law xiii (Elizabeth Mertz, ed., Ashgate Publg. Co.
2008).
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Thus, by design, law and practice seeks to combine insights from both
academics and practitioners. It seeks to encourage traditionally theoretical
macro legal scholarship to incorporate more practice and traditionally
practical micro skills scholarship to incorporate more theory. With their
real-world perspective of the feasibility of proposed reforms, practitioners
can make genuinely needed contributions to legal scholarship. In addition,
actual practice experience provides a readily accessible and relevant source
of empirical legal data.218 Likewise, academics not only can become
creative and formidable practitioners, but also through their scholarship
and lobbying efforts can address macro legal issues beyond the scope of
micro law and thereby help alleviate some of the alienation of practical
lawmaking,219 wherein lawyers who focus solely on practical lawmaking
may feel disconnected from a sense of justice.
Critical to law and practice is this indispensable combination of
theory and practice and of academics and practitioners. Such a hybrid, by
deﬁnition, must always employ insights from both sides of law and of the
legal profession. All law and practice scholarship requires both theory and
practice: because law and practice seeks to further justice,220 normative
theory is essential to deﬁne and understand justice; because law and
practice is focused upon legal doctrine used by actual lawmakers, practical
lawmaking also is paramount.
Law and practice does not intend to criticize existing forms of legal
scholarship, which generally are of high quality and great value. Purely
theoretical articles and nuts-and-bolts practice guides are equally illuminating in very different yet complementary ways. Let the uninhibited
waters of academic freedom flow. Consequently, law and practice scholarship should not supplant but rather supplement all existing legal
scholarship.
C. Some potential past examples
Although a comprehensive list of law and practice examples requires more
research, here are seven potential candidates for such scholarship: (1)
formalism and positivism; (2) logical reasoning; (3) law and economics; (4)
feminist legal theory; (5) Brown and Transformative Law and Scholarship;
(6) academic–practitioner partnerships; and (7) empirical studies of micro
law.

217 For a discussion of legal doctrine’s evocation of justice,
see supra sec. III.B.2.
218 See supra sec. IV.A.

219 Wilkinson, supra n. 106, at 463.
220 See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
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1. Formalism and positivism

Formalism221 and positivism222 are legal theories so entrenched in
practical lawmaking that legal practitioners may not even be aware that
they rely upon them by default.223 Although practitioners recognize the
limits of both theories,224 both nevertheless continue to deﬁne how law is
conceptualized and analyzed in a democracy.
2. Logical reasoning

Likewise, logical reasoning—in particular, the syllogism—has supplied the
predominant language of legal discourse since Aristotle.225 This legal
theory has so pervaded academic and practical legal discourse that even
its deconstructionist critics are forced to rely upon logical reasoning to
craft the very arguments revealing logical reasoning’s limitations. Even
narrative jurisprudence relies upon logic.226
3. Law and economics

Law and economics is “[t]he application to various legal questions of the
forms of analysis found in economics . . . .”227 As exempliﬁed by the
Federalist Society and the Olin Foundation, the law and economics
movement arguably is one of the most successful examples of normative
theory in practical lawmaking and legal academic–legal practitioner
collaboration. What began as a network of conservative law students and
lawyers, the Federalist Society had considerable impact in President
George W. Bush’s Administration and on his judicial appointees.228
Similarly, the conservative Olin Foundation has generously funded law
and economics research in the academy.229
Law and economics rhetoric is commonly used by legal authors—
including academics and practitioners.230 Such “market efﬁciency”
rhetoric has become so prevalent that many policymakers currently
believe “that the primary path to greatness in the social sectors is to
become ‘more like a business.’”231 Moreover, law and economics “can

221 For a deﬁnition of “formalism,” see supra sec. III.A.1.
222 For a deﬁnition of “positivism,” see supra sec. III.A.2.
223 See supra sec. III.
224 Id.
225 See Lind, supra n. 82, at 120.
226 Storytelling is still a form of communication and as
such must have logical coherence to be understood. See
generally Symposium, Legal Storytelling, 87 Mich. L. Rev.
2073 (1989).
227 Bix, supra n. 7, at 115.

228 See e.g. Theresa M. Beiner, Shift Happens: The U.S.
Supreme Court’s Shifting Antidiscrimination Rhetoric, 42 U.
Toledo L. Rev. 37, 82–84 (2010).
229 Thomas O. McGarity, A Movement, a Lawsuit, and the
Integrity of Sponsored Law and Economics Research, 21 Stan.
L. & Policy Rev. 51, 59–66 (2010).
230 Michael Murray, Law and Economics as a Rhetorical
Perspective in Law 30, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1830573
(Apr. 2011).
231 Jim Collins, Good to Great and the Social Sectors: A
Monograph to Accompany Good to Great 1 (Jim Collins,
2005); see also Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and
Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1227, 1227 (2003).
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provide litigators, transactional attorneys, and policy makers with valuable
analytical tools.”232 Finally, law and economics’ normative theoretical
assumptions—particularly that of “[h]omo economicus,”233 the rational
cost-beneﬁt maximizing person—have been criticized by behavioral
economics,234 law and socioeconomics,235 and neuroeconomics.236
4. Feminist legal theory

Feminist legal theory “focus[es] on the allegedly patriarchal nature of legal
doctrine or the application of law—that is, the way law purportedly
favours the interests of men over those of women and works to maintain a
hierarchical structure in which men have more power than women.”237
Although feminist legal theory has changed legal doctrine in a
number of areas, none perhaps has changed as radically as American
domestic-violence law. Before the 1970s, domestic violence was not
considered a legal problem requiring any government intervention: it was
either condoned or viewed as a private family matter.238 Today, domestic
violence is a crime, and pro-arrest or mandatory-arrest policies have been
almost uniformly adopted throughout the United States.239 This
remarkable transformation in legal doctrine over mere decades was a
triumph of feminist legal theory applied to practical lawmaking. In fact,
social science research in this area “for the most part, has followed from
the agenda of the battered women’s movement and focused on either
furthering its goals or evaluating progress toward them.”240
5. Brown and transformative law and scholarship

Dean Rachel Moran, then-President of the Association of American Law
Schools selected “transformative law” as her presidential theme.241 Moran
also showcased Brown, the successful impact litigation developed with
little help from legal academics, as “a model for transformative legal
scholars[.]”242 Critical of existing legal scholarship, Moran observed that
“Brown differs substantially from what we currently deﬁne as ‘scholarship’—a point that should prompt re-examination of how we use that

232 Sternlight, supra n. 15, at 741.
233 See e.g. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Freefall: America, Free Markets,
and the Sinking of the World Economy 249 (W. W. Norton &
Co., Inc. 2010). In fairness, law and economics has evolved to
use more sophisticated models of behavior. See Richard A.
Posner, A Failure of Capitalism: The Crisis of ’08 and the
Descent into Depression xiv (Harv. U. Press 2009).
234 See generally Vandenbergh et al., supra n. 16.
235 See generally Jeffrey L. Harrison, Law and Socioeconomics, 49 J. Leg. Educ. 224 (1999).

236 See generally Jedediah Purdy, The Promise (and Limits)
of Neuroeconomics, 58 Ala. L. Rev. 1 (2006).
237 Bix, supra n. 7, at 67.
238 Kristin Bumiller, The Nexus of Domestic Violence
Reform and Social Science: From Instrument of Social
Change to Institutionalized Surveillance, 6 Annual Rev. L.
Soc. Sci. 173, 174 (2010).
239 Id. at 175–76.
240 Id. at 174.
241 Moran, supra n. 56, at 1.
242 Id. at 6.
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term” and that “the transformative lawyering exhibited in Brown barely
resembles our current notions of scholarship.”243
When articulating her vision of “transformative scholarship,” which
can be considered a form of law and practice scholarship, Moran identiﬁed
three models “for combining reform advocacy and academic
respectability[:]”244 (1) “[d]evoting sustained attention to a single
problem[;]” (2) forming academic and nonacademic partnerships; and (3)
“[e]mbracing controversy in a world that idealizes a studied distance from
conflict[.]”245
Moran concluded, “A legal academy that recognizes that civic-minded
research, far from being suspect, should be encouraged and embraced will
be stronger for having made that choice.”246
6. Academic–practitioner partnerships

Informed by reformist critical legal movements that promote “‘scholars as
justice practitioners’ and ‘activist lawyers as theorists’”247 such as Nisha
Agarwal and Jocelyn Simonson’s “Summer Theory Institute[,]”248 Gerald
López’s “Rebellious Lawyering[,]”249 Eric Yamamoto’s “Critical Race
Praxis[,]”250 and Phyllis Goldfarb’s “Theory-Practice Spiral[,]”251 law and
practice is nonetheless distinguishable by its lack of political agenda.
Because law and practice is primarily concerned with methodology, law
and practice scholarship can (and should) run the ideological gamut. Self-

243 Id. at 4, 6.
244 Id. at 6.
245 Id. at 6, 17, 18.
246 Id. at 18.
247 Julie A. Su & Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Coalitions: Theory and Praxis, in Crossroads, Directions, and a New Critical
Race Theory 379, 387 (Francisco Valdes et al., eds., Temple U. Press 2002).
248 Agarwal & Simonson, supra n. 24, at 457. The Harvard Law School Summer Theory Institute seeks “to bring theory to
practice—along with a new conception of what kind of theory is directly relevant to public interest practice.” Id. Each
summer, the two full-time practitioners lead twelve to fourteen law student interns at New York City public-interest organizations “to read and discuss social theory in the context of their day-to-day experiences working for social change through
the law.” Id.
249 Gerald P. López, Rebellious Lawyering: One Chicano’s Vision of Progressive Law Practice (Westview Press, Inc. 1992).
López’s “rebellious idea of lawyering against subordination” is that “lawyers must know how to work with (not just on behalf
of )” their marginalized clients, “how to collaborate with other professional and lay allies rather than ignoring the help that
these other problem-solvers may provide in a given situation[,] . . . how to educate those with whom they work, particularly
about law and professional lawyering, and, at the same time, they must open themselves up to being educated by all those
with whom they come in contact, particularly about the traditions and experiences of life on the bottom and at the margins.”
Id. at 37.
250 See Su & Yamamoto, supra n. 249. Su and Yamamoto collaborated to force garment manufacturers and retailers to accept
legal responsibility for the plight of garment workers kept in de facto slavery. Id. at 379; see also Moran, supra n. 56, at 17 &
nn. 17, 20.
251 Goldfarb, supra n. 7, at 1599. Goldfarb’s “theory-practice spiral” is an “ongoing feedback relationship” between feminist
theorists and clinical educators. Id. at 1617.
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styled progressives, conservatives, and critical theorists are all welcome in
this house.
7. Empirical studies of micro law

Because, as demonstrated by the legal determinacy paradox,252 the
creation and revision of legal doctrine is possible only through practical
lawmaking, legal skills253—the means through which lawyers engage in
practical lawmaking—can greatly influence legal doctrine. Given the
importance of legal skills in the creation and revision of legal doctrine,
micro-legal-skills scholarship needs to go beyond the National Institute
for Trial Advocacy’s motto of “learning by doing”254 to “learning about
doing.” Micro-legal-skills instruction currently is limited by a ﬁrstgeneration methodology of “learning by doing” that fails to memorialize,
test, or aggregate legal-skills data in a format usable by other legal scholarship.
Although this ﬁrst generation “learning-by-doing” methodology has
been effective in training accomplished lawyers, its lack of self-reflection
and aggregation has prevented it from having relevance beyond practitioner training and thereby has perpetuated the so-called theory–practice
divide. First-generation skills instruction “will teach one only what some
people believe is effective, and that begs the question[,] How do those
folks know?”255 There thus is a need for a next generation “learning-aboutdoing” methodology with the requisite self-reflection and aggregation
needed to provide a useful empirical legal-data source directly applicable
to legal scholarship.
Here are some promising examples. The dialogue between Dean
Robert Klonoff and practitioner Paul Colby256 and litigation consultants
Douglas Rich and Ellen Leggett257 concerning the empirical testing of
Klonoff and Colby’s sponsorship theory establishes a precedent for such
next-generation skills training. Because forms of practical lawmaking such
as courtroom proceedings and depositions are already memorialized by

252 See supra sec. III.E.
253 For a deﬁnition of “legal skills,” see supra n. 186.
254 National Institute for Trial Advocacy, Publication Catalog i, http://www.lexisnexis.com/documents/pdf/
20110707034204_large.pdf (2012).
255 Michael J. Saks, Turning Practice into Progress: Better Lawyering through Experimentation, 66 Notre Dame L. Rev. 801,
802 (1991).
256 Robert H. Klonoff & Paul L. Colby, Winning Jury Trials: Trial Tactics and Sponsorship Strategies (3d ed., Natl. Inst. Tr.
Advoc. 2007).
257 Quentin Brogdon, Mr. Brogdon Responds: A Reply to a Flawed Defense of Sponsorship Theory, 63 Tex. B.J. 756, 756–58
(2000) (summarizing debate and collecting authorities).
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legal practitioners, law and practice researchers can study transcripts and
videotapes of actual court proceedings.
One potential success story is the apparent widespread acceptance of
empirical legal scholarship analyzing judicial decisionmaking. Though the
validity of these studies remains disputed,258 what appears undisputed is
that they present an example of how aggregating practical lawmaking—
legal doctrine, namely judicial opinions and case outcomes—can create a
form of practice-based legal scholarship whose scholarly rigor appears
acceptable to the entire legal academy.259
D. A more accurate and more rigorous study of legal doctrine
Although law and practice does not intend to supplant other forms of
scholarship, because it examines the entire micro and macro picture of
legal doctrine instead of just a part, it should result in a more accurate and
more intellectually rigorous study of legal doctrine. The hybrid study of
the interrelationship between micro law and macro law may provide a
more comprehensive and insightful perspective than the isolated study of
either.

VI. Conclusion: How Academics and Practitioners
Should Work Together
The law and practice framework encourages practitioners and academics
to employ, study, critique, and revise both micro and macro law. Because
of limited time, limited resources, or professional necessity, most
advocates and lawmakers will attain greater expertise in uniquely
academic or practical pursuits, normative theory or practical lawmaking,
micro law or macro law. But they can nevertheless collaborate with their
professional counterparts.
For example, imagine the collaboration between a family law
professor and a family law practitioner. With their shared interest in micro
and macro family law, the professor might summarize a current normative
theory in family law scholarship for the practitioner. In response, the practitioner might relate micro law experiences that provide empirical data
consistent or inconsistent with the theory, which the professor might then
use in future scholarship. The professor might also help the practitioner

258 See Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies That Attempt to Understand the Factors
Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 Duke L.J. 1895 (2009).
259 See e.g. Corey Rayburn Yung, Judged by the Company You Keep: An Empirical Study of the Ideologies of Judges on the
United States Courts of Appeals, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 1133, 1133 (2010) (collecting authorities).
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formulate an impact litigation strategy to make the applicable micro law
more consistent with the professor’s preferred theory. Because the
professor knows that the practitioner will try to change the applicable legal
doctrine to better reflect that theory, the professor will not experience
cognitive dissonance.260
Likewise, the practitioner might tell the professor about systemic
problems with family law legal doctrine. The professor might then lobby
the legislature or write a law review article about these problems. Because
the practitioner knows that the professor will try to do something about
these problems, the practitioner will not experience cognitive
dissonance.261
Many pressing legal issues require the coordinated efforts of both
academics and practitioners. As Dean Raymond Pierce concluded, “This is
an honorable profession that should play a major role in society in
upholding justice and order. It should come together.”262 Surely the
important social and legal issues of our time are worthy of the coordinated
efforts of both academics and practitioners along the entire micro–macro
legal continuum.

260 For a deﬁnition of “cognitive dissonance,” see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
261 Id.
262 Brust, supra n. 59. For example, the critical issue of indigent access to counsel includes the political manipulation of legal
clinic jurisdiction: powerful corporate interests afraid of legal-clinic litigation lobby state legislatures to force public law
schools to stop representing indigent clients claiming corporate injury. This issue is so urgent that law professor and celebrity
advocate Lawrence Tribe has been appointed to head the U.S. Department of Justice Access to Justice Initiative. See Gregory,
supra n. 53, at A11. See also e.g. H. Reese Hansen, The President’s Message: Attacks on Clinical Programs and the Relevance of
Core Values, 2010-2 aalsnews 1–3, 13 (May 2010) (available at http://www.aals.org/services_newsletter_presMay10.php);
Peter A. Joy, Political Interference with Clinical Legal Education: Denying Access to Justice, 74 Tul. L. Rev. 235, 235 (1999);
Krell, supra n. 78, at 259.

LegalComm_Rhetoric_2012_v09tp_interior 7/17/12 5:05 PM Page 314

